The reign of Tu-tsung (1264–1274) and his successors to 1279 by DAVIS, Richard L.
CHAPTER 12
THE REIGN OF TU-TSUNG (1264–1274) AND HIS
SUCCESSORS TO 1279
Richard L. Davis
dynasty besieged
As it approached its end, the Southern Sung dynasty had been weakened
by spendthrift emperors, disabled by squabbling bureaucrats, and stretched
to the brink of bankruptcy by the costs of wars that had lingered for six
decades. By the 1260s a certain disillusionment and fatalism hung over Lin-
an. The emperor, Li-tsung (r. 1224–64), seemed to be evading despair by
escaping into lechery. His high officials evaded responsibility for their failures
by engaging in political vendettas. Attempts at reviving economic prosperity
through government initiatives had lost their appeal after several disastrous
failures. The active pursuit of peace was similarly abandoned. Adding to this
malaise was the inability of the Chao imperial line to provide suitable heirs
on a regular basis.
Three of the six Southern Sung emperors before 1275 did not produce a
son who survived him, and this lack of patrilineal succession necessitated the
adoption of sons from less prestigious branches of the imperial clan. Kao-
tsung, Ning-tsung, and Li-tsung all had lengthy reigns that began in early
adulthood and continued for three decades or more, yet they all died without
sons to succeed them. Hsiao-tsung, Kuang-tsung, and Tu-tsung (r. 1264–74)
were succeeded by infant sons who were ineffectual rulers. Historical records
provide few clues as to why sons were in short supply. What is known is that
the absence of a proper heir, namely the son of the emperor’s primary wife,
created political instability at the time of succession.
Li-tsung was infamous for his unruly passions. His special favor toward con-
sorts Chia and Yen may have been, for court observers, pardonable excesses. His
indiscretions such as cavorting with common street prostitutes and entertain-
ing Buddhist nuns in the palace were not. These liaisons reflected an obsession
with the opposite sex and compromised the majesty of the throne. The obses-
sion did not yield its usual fruit, an abundance of sons who would have been
potential heirs. No children were born to him and Empress Hsieh. Lesser
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consorts gave birth to four boys, but they all died relatively young.1 Li-tsung
had a daughter, born to his favored Consort Chia, whom he reportedly loved
immensely, but the daughter died at age twenty-one.
In the 1240s, roughly twenty years into the reign and as Li-tsung approached
his forties, pressure emerged from the bureaucracy for Li-tsung to adopt one
or several imperial clansmen in preparation for the eventual nomination of
an heir. The emperor had agreed to bring selected young clansmen into the
palace for special instruction. He would go no further. Apparently still in
good health, he probably felt no compelling reason for haste. In 1253, as he
approached fifty, the pressure for an heir intensified. He elevated one of those
youths, the only one known to have entered the palace in the 1240s, to the
status of imperial son (huang-tzu). The nomination generated tension at court.
The nominee, Chao Ch’i (b. 1240), was the emperor’s nephew, born to his
younger brother, Chao Yu¨-jui. Li-tsung and Chao Yu¨-jui shared a common set
of parents, so the blood ties between Li-tsung and Chao Ch’i were close. The
adoption of nephews was common within the Chao imperial family, and there
was precedent for the action. Yet questions about the legitimacy of Chao Ch’i
detracted from his desirability as a candidate.
Chao Ch’i was probably born to one of Chao Yu¨-jui’s secondary wives, and
adopted by another, no doubt Chao Yu¨-jui’s primary wife.2 With concubines
generally of lower social standing, their offspring tended to have a diminished
status. Genealogy also posed problems in that Chao Ch’i descended from the
line of Chao Te-chao, the Sung founder T’ai-tsu’s second son, like Li-tsung
himself and in contrast to the preceding three rulers, who had descended from
Chao Te-fang, T’ai-tsu’s fourth son. Some at court may have preferred, to the
extent that adoption was necessary anyway, for the emperor to revert back
to the line of earlier emperors, which in effect would undo the intervention
by Shih Mi-yu¨an in 1224. This would require the emperor to abandon his
own nephew in favor of more distant kin descended from earlier emperors. Li-
tsung did not do this. There also were other more sinister concerns. The Sung
dynasty had experienced several cases of familial struggles over the throne,
either between father and son or between brothers. With Chao Yu¨-jui still
living in nearby Shao-hsing, there was the potential threat of conflict should
he develop greater political ambitions and seek to overthrow his son Chao Ch’i.
1 On the succession affair, see T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977) 42,
pp. 817, 820; 43, p. 847; 248, pp. 8789–90; Chao Hsi-nien, Chao-shih tsu-p’u [Academia Sinica, Fu
Ssu-nien Library, rare edition] (Hong Kong, 1937) 1, pp. 41a, 69a; John W. Chaffee, Branches of heaven:
A history of the imperial clan of Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 216, 243.
2 K’o Wei-ch’i, Sung-shih hsin-pien (1557; Shanghai, 1936) 14, p. 52b; Ch’ien Shih-sheng, Nan Sung shu
(c. 1590; n.p., 1792) 6, p. 1a. Most sources intentionally avoid discussion of the emperor’s maternity;
see SS 46, p. 891; Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 69b; Pi Yu¨an, Hsu¨ Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter HTC
(1958)] [Te-yu¨-t’ang tsang-pan 1801 ed.] (1792; Peking, 1958) 178, p. 4853.
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Some officials had suggested that adopting the son of a dead clansman would
be a safer choice. Li-tsung dismissed the idea that Chao Yu¨-jui posed a threat,
no doubt concluding that he understood his brother’s character better than
the bureaucrats. With historical hindsight, we know his faith to be justified,
for Chao Yu¨-jui never developed imperial ambitions.
The bureaucracy was also concerned about the abilities and training of
the next emperor. Chief Councilor Wu Ch’ien, with reference to the succes-
sion, is reported to have said: “I lack the talent of Shih Mi-yu¨an and Prince
Chung [Chao Ch’i] lacks the good fortune of Your Majesty.”3 The statement,
made while the now adopted son, Chao Ch’i, had yet to be installed as heir
apparent, came without explanation. But we can see that Wu Ch’ien had
created a complex reference that compares his own humility with respect to
the long-deceased Shih Mi-yu¨an, still highly regarded by Li-tsung, and the
expectation that Chao Ch’i would be ill equipped, either by nature or by cir-
cumstances, to confront the difficulties of succession in a way that Li-tsung
was not. However it was interpreted at court, the quote leaves little doubt
that Wu Ch’ien anticipated an uneasy transfer of power following Li-tsung’s
death. Four decades earlier, on the eve of Ning-tsung’s death in 1224, Chief
Councilor Shih Mi-yu¨an had engineered, reportedly at the emperor’s instruc-
tions, the last-minute replacement of Ning-tsung’s adopted son, Chao Hung,
and elevated Ning-tsung’s nephew, the future Li-tsung, to the throne. The
switch might have precipitated a civil war had Shih Mi-yu¨an not acted with
consummate political skill, inasmuch as the emperor was not around to verify
the decision. Traditional historians have interpreted Wu Ch’ien’s statement
a generation later to imply that he opposed the elevation of Chao Ch’i. This
would be rather curious. Wu Ch’ien had pressed Li-tsung to name an heir
at a time when the only available candidate was Chao Ch’i. The same Wu
Ch’ien, by disassociating himself from Shih Mi-yu¨an’s activism, was showing
he had no interest in tampering with the line of succession. In this context,
Wu Ch’ien may have regarded Li-tsung’s procrastination in installing an heir
as a threat to the succession of Chao Ch’i, just as decades earlier Ning-tsung’s
procrastination in the elevation of Chao Hung left him vulnerable to the pos-
sible overreach of Shih Mi-yu¨an. Wu Ch’ien may have wanted to preclude
interference in an orderly succession, whether of Chao Ch’i or anyone else.
Chao Ch’i was finally appointed heir apparent (t’ai-tzu) in the sixth month
of 1260, and his training seems to have been very strict.4 The councilor of
the right, Chia Ssu-tao, is portrayed as fully supportive of the Chao Ch’i
nomination, even to the point of personally imploring Li-tsung to act. For
3 On the statement and its significance, see SS 418, pp. 12517–19; 45, p. 873; 425, p. 12669; 474,
p. 13781; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 43, p. 12a; 56, p. 2b.
4 HTC (1958) 176, p. 4801.
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the eminently practical Chia Ssu-tao, nothing mattered more than a smooth
transfer of power. Chao Ch’i, whom Chia had served as tutor, had proven himself
both deferential and submissive. By aggressively supporting the young man’s
advancement, Chia Ssu-tao sought to win his lasting favor, just as Shih Mi-
yu¨an’s 1224 intervention won him the enduring goodwill of Li-tsung. Li-tsung
suddenly died on 16 November 1264 after only two days of illness, just shy of
sixty years old. His throne passed without incident to the twenty-four-year-old
Chao Ch’i, known to history as Tu-tsung.
Chao Ch’i is described by authors of the Sung dynastic history (Sung shih), as
being bright, perceptive, and earnest in his studies. These traits had convinced
Li-tsung of Chao Ch’i’s worthiness to inherit the throne.5 Such assertions may
be little more than perfunctory, a reflection of later historians’ unquestioning
commitment to defending the imperial institution, a commitment that often
entailed compromises in the interest of image building. Nothing in Tu-tsung’s
later conduct suggested the total absence of such traits, so we may grant some
kernel of truth to the description. Nonetheless, much like Li-tsung before
him, Tu-tsung’s conduct took a bad turn soon after he assumed the reins
of power. The once-disciplined Tu-tsung was subsequently accused, among
other things, of unconscionable extravagance.6 He regularly held court feasts
on an elaborate scale, paid for increasingly with public funds rather than from
his private treasury. Equally alarming was his indiscriminate advancement of
meritless kinsmen, his own and those of his empress, to honored titular posts.
Such advancements sometimes involved over a hundred individuals at once.
Tu-tsung held the elaborate Ming-t’ang (Hall of Brilliance) ceremonies at least
twice during his ten-year reign. The cost of the ceremonies, though consider-
able, was dwarfed by the cost of the great feasts and generous round of civil
service promotions that invariably accompanied the events. Such extravagance
implied irresponsibility, an emperor out of touch with the times, insensitive
to the plight of his overtaxed and war-weary people.
Tu-tsung also drew censure from later historians and contemporaries for his
dependence on Chia Ssu-tao. Chia was a holdover from the previous reign. As
councilor of the right since 1259 and the sole councilor after 1260, he was
well entrenched before the Tu-tsung accession. Even allowing for any political
debt associated with Chia’s supporting his 1260 nomination as heir, Tu-tsung’s
attachment to his councilor seemed excessive. In the case of Li-tsung, favor for
Chia Ssu-tao seems to have grown out of his affection for a favorite consort,
who was Chia Ssu-tao’s elder sister. The two men, being of comparable age
5 SS 46, pp. 891–2.
6 SS 46, pp. 895, 897, 898, 900, 903, 904, 918–19; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 5b; HTC (1958) 179,
p. 4893; 180, pp. 4926–7.
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and sharing the same passion for sensual indulgence, had become fast friends.
Circumstances surrounding Tu-tsung’s favor shown to Chia were entirely dif-
ferent. Twenty-seven years Tu-tsung’s senior, Chia Ssu-tao had served him as
grand preceptor for four years prior to the 1264 accession. Lacking examina-
tion credentials, Chia Ssu-tao had struck most of officialdom as deserving of
neither the position nor the respect shown by his imperial student. Tu-tsung,
however, attached no importance to Chia’s lack of credentials. He had set the
entire court on edge by referring to Chia Ssu-tao as teacher, not servant, by
rising when Chia Ssu-tao made court appearances, and by kneeling in tears to
beseech him to remain in office.7 This gave Tu-tsung, and indeed the throne
itself, an image of subservience. So complete was Tu-tsung’s confidence and
reliance on Chia Ssu-tao that in 1267 he promoted Chia to esteemed special
military councilor (p’ing-chang chu¨n-kuo chung-shih), a post Chia retained for
the duration of the reign.
Extravagance and dependence aside, perhaps Tu-tsung’s most unfortunate
shortcoming, by traditional historical accounts, was his overall ambivalence
toward the ever-present Mongol threat.8 The cost of ambivalence was high.
Compared with the previous decade, the Tu-tsung years (1264–74) were tran-
quil. Border hostilities persisted, but on a smaller scale. Natural disasters
occurred, but with less damage. Expenditures for war and extravagances under-
mined the economy, but without completely exhausting imperial treasuries.
If Tu-tsung, by making the most of these tranquil times, had made significant
progress toward either defeating the Mongols or striking a peace accord with
them, or had he solicited and applied solutions to the Sung empire’s mount-
ing pile of persistent problems, then his decade-long reign may have renewed
confidence in the dynasty and stimulated loyalty among its officials. This is
the view of traditional critics, but the reality is that war, peace, conservation,
and reform had all been attempted only a few years earlier. The results had
been unimpressive at best, and at times were disastrous. Perhaps the conflict
and divisiveness of the recent past, more than the emperor’s timid personality,
explain why Tu-tsung chose to do nothing dramatic in seeking to reverse the
situation. These were largely years of maintenance, not years entirely wasted.9
Military confrontation: Setting the stage
The overriding concern of the era, for the emperor and officials alike, was
border stability. Tu-tsung’s decision to retain the services of Chia Ssu-tao may
7 SS 418, p. 12524; 474, pp. 13783–4; HTC (1958) 178, p. 4879; 179, p. 4897.
8 SS 46, p. 918; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 14, p. 54a.
9 Hu Chao-hsi et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih (Ch’eng-tu, 1992), pp. 281–96.
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partly have been due to Chia’s extensive military experience. The son of a
distinguished commander, Chia Ssu-tao himself had emerged late in the Li-
tsung reign as civil and military commissioner in the central Sung territories.
He had led armies there against the Mongols. His promotion to chief councilor
in 1260 was, in theory, a reward for directing the successful defense of Hsiang-
yang. Chia Ssu-tao’s critics, past and present, have dismissed him as a fraud,
someone who exaggerated or misrepresented military feats merely to enhance
his political status when, in fact, he cared little for the empire’s defense.10
In this way, an empire that should have been preparing for war was allowed
to drift. This charge is similar to the one leveled against Shih Sung-chih a
generation earlier, and it is equally groundless.
The Chia Ssu-tao administration invested substantially in the defense of
strategic areas. The “Basic Annals” section of the Sung dynastic history reports
that under Tu-tsung some fourteen million strings of cash were allocated for
defense of the Ching-hu region (mostly for Hsiang-yang), another ten million
strings for Szechwan (largely its eastern regions, which were still administered
by the Sung), and another four million strings for the Huai border area to
the east.11 Concentrated between 1269 and 1273 and apparently intended as
a supplement to regional defense allocations, these appropriations were ear-
marked for either compensating soldiers or fortifying cities. The court also
made a special effort, according to the “Basic Annals,” to provide extraordi-
nary commendations and material rewards for meritorious service along the
border, to heighten the morale of troops. As for military installations, regional
governments, often at directives from the Sung court, prepared for war at a
frenzied pace.
In the west, administrators at Ho-chou4 were determined to increase agri-
cultural productivity and directed soldiers to till the land. They reinforced city
walls to reduce vulnerability and built palisades along the Chia-ling River to
defend Ho-chou4 against boats approaching from the north. At Ching-chou2
(modern Chiang-ling, Hupei) storehouses were filled with provisions and the
able-bodied men recruited for military training. At nearby Ying-chou3, where
a new city had been built on the southern side of the Han River, walls were
heavily fortified and the riverbanks planted with trees to make access to the
shore difficult. The court ordered new walls to be built around Lin-an to
10 SS 474, pp. 13780–1; Herbert Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275): A ‘bad last minister’?” in Confucian
personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif., 1962), pp. 217–34, especially
pp. 224–5; Richard L. Davis, Wind against the mountain: The crisis of politics and culture in thirteenth-century
China (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), pp. 42–9.
11 SS 46; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 320, 331–7.
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enhance the security of the emperor and court.12 The Sung did not stand idly
by as the Mongols began to tighten their hold on already conquered territory
or heavily besieged border towns. The Mongols’ encirclement of Hsiang-yang
was maintained for five years, yet the Sung managed repeatedly to penetrate
Mongol lines to deliver desperately needed provisions to defenders. In the
west, again at Ho-chou4, the Sung frustrated Mongol efforts to build a nearby
wall designed to protect its armies from Sung counterattacks.13 Sung defensive
measures were complemented by offensives attempting to regain lost territo-
ries. Their counteroffensives against Mongol-held Ch’eng-tu, Lu-chou3, and
T’ung-ch’uan in the west of Szechwan, and Jao-chou (in Kiangsi) yielded some
gains.14 These activities reveal not only the Sung court’s anticipation of mil-
itary conflict but also its commitment to doing everything possible to defeat
the Mongols. As special military councilor and chief decision maker at court,
Chia Ssu-tao deserves some credit for this.
The Sung’s problem lay not so much with a lack of preparation as with an
inability to keep pace with the preparations being made by a resourceful enemy.
The Mongol military machine was formidable, especially under the direction
of its shrewd new ruler. Prior to the 1260 accession of Khubilai, the Mongol
court, recognizing that its strength lay in cavalry, had attempted a conquest
of the Sung from the west, by overrunning Szechwan. This bold strategy had
seemed sound, yet conquering the mountainous southwest proved far more
exacting than had been envisioned, a struggle underscored by the long and
fruitless siege of Ho-chou4, where the previous Mongol ruler, Mo¨ngke, had
died in 1259. Upon accession, Khubilai initiated a major policy change. The
Mongols now focused their resources on central Sung territory and exploited
the waterways there to menace Lin-an at closer range.15 Khubilai chose largely
to ignore the Szechwan theater. Indispensable to this new strategy was building
a sizable naval force, a somewhat novel idea for the horse-loving Mongols, but
an excellent tactic nonetheless. The Yu¨an dynastic history (Yu¨an shih) reports
that by the late 1260s the Mongols had begun to train a navy of their own.
Recruiting some seventy thousand men from its territory along the Yangtze
River, the Mongols built a sizable arsenal of ships and weapons, and collected
12 SS 451, pp. 13280–3; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, p. 14b; 60, p. 3a; Sung Lien et al., Yu¨an shih [Po-na-pen
1930–7 ed.] (1370; Peking, 1976) 127, p. 3100; HTC (1958) 179, p. 4895; Hu Chao-hsi et al., Sung-mo
Ssu-ch’uan chan-cheng shih-liao hsu¨an-pien (Ch’eng-tu, 1984), p. 156; Li T’ien-ming, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih
(Taipei, 1988), pp. 945–52, 965–7.
13 HTC (1958) 179, pp. 4886, 4895; 180, pp. 4915, 4921.
14 Hu et al., Sung-mo Ssu-ch’uan, pp. 138, 547; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1040–2; SS 451, p. 13272;
HTC (1958) 178, p. 4862.
15 Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 313–17; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 925–30; Sung
et al., Yu¨an shih 128, p. 3125; HTC (1958) 178, pp. 4875–6.
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provisions from as far as K’ai-feng to store along the central border region.16
Allocation of more men and mate´riel followed. To meet the growing need for
manpower, Mongol commanders had no hesitation about pillaging. Mongol
armies repeatedly descended the Han River and attacked cities and counties
in the vicinity of Hsiang-yang, taking in each foray as many as fifty thou-
sand prisoners and hundreds of ships, all, of course, later to be used against the
Sung.17 Men were also snatched up in Szechwan, probably with the same objec-
tive.18 The Mongols acknowledged their own inexperience in naval warfare
by incorporating more and more Chinese into their armed forces. Drawing
increasingly upon the vast numbers and technical knowledge of the Han
Chinese majority, the Mongols waged campaigns in which the Han Chinese
in their armies outnumbered Mongols five to one.19
Forced assimilation into the Mongol military presented an agonizing chal-
lenge to the Sung court. As Mongols carted off a growing number of Han
Chinese from the south, the Sung found itself short of prospective soldiers and
taxpayers, a problem that undermined the empire’s military and economic
viability. The immediate military threat proved easier to address than the eco-
nomic crisis, but the Sung response was desperate. In the case of Hsiang-yang,
large numbers of children, probably teenagers, were inducted into regional
armies.20 In Lin-an and its vicinity, all males fifteen and older were pressed
into service.21 Armies contained large numbers of older men as well, as the
Sung was forced to delay retirement of soldiers. According to the prefect of
Chiang-ling, at least twenty percent of the Sung army was either too young
or too old.22 This is, in all likelihood, a conservative estimate. Another short-
term solution to the shortage of men was to shift responsibility for regional
defense to informally recruited militias (min-ping) or, as was common farther
south, to draw upon the large pool of non–Han Chinese groups.23 The resort
to popular militias occurred largely in the early 1270s, toward the close of
the dynasty, by which time government fears about controlling such armies
were overcome by its desperate need to survive. In its last years, the court of
Tu-tsung moved to pardon rather than reprimand deserters. It offered high
office and generous rewards in the hope of winning back some of the martial
16 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 7, pp. 128, 131, 133; 128, p. 3120; HTC (1958) 178, pp. 4879–80; 179, p. 4894;
180, p. 4917.
17 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 6, pp. 115, 121; 128, p. 3119; HTC (1958) 178, p. 4873; 179, pp. 4885, 4902.
18 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 7, p. 129.
19 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 8, p. 160; HTC (1958) 178, pp. 4879–80.
20 SS 422, p. 12619; HTC (1958) 180, p. 4920.
21 SS 418, p. 12531.
22 Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, p. 7b.
23 SS 47, p. 935; 418, p. 12534; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 60, p. 4b; 61, p. 7b; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 175,
pp. 8b–9a.
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talent lost to the enemy.24 Nothing worked. A practical solution would have
involved adoption of enemy tactics by harassing the northern border region,
carting off provisions, and snatching up young men for induction into the
armed services. The Sung did not do this.
For virtually the entire Tu-tsung reign, both Sung and Mongol military
efforts centered on controlling the area surrounding Hsiang-yang, along the
central border. The reason was simple. If the Mongols captured the cities
along the Han River, the one hundred and eighty–mile stretch from Hsiang-
yang to Han-yang, then they could easily gain access to the Yangtze River.
Command of the Yangtze would in turn leave Lin-an vulnerable to assault
from the west. With the dynasty’s fate so closely tied to the fate of Hsiang-
yang, the Sung invested heavily in reinforcing cities along the Han River. The
Mongols responded with an increasingly unbreakable encirclement of Hsiang-
yang in 1268 that continued for another five years.25 Sung tactics consisted
largely of building stronger walls and sabotaging Mongol efforts to navigate
the Han River. However, the Mongols were more aggressive and innovative.
In addition to a major expansion of naval power that yielded an additional
seventy thousand men and five thousand boats, the Mongols built observation
towers in the riverbed and forts along the shores, isolating the city from outside
information and supplies.
Directing the Mongol offensive was A-chu (Aju, 1234–87), a comman-
der destined to rise to great heights after his stunning successes against the
Sung. Fully surrounding Hsiang-yang posed immense obstacles, for the heav-
ily defended city sat on the southern bank of the Han River and, when cut
off by land from the south, could often turn for assistance to Fan-ch’eng, a
town directly opposite on the Han River’s northern bank. The Mongols began
a blockade of Fan-ch’eng in 1268 by building more walled barriers and set-
tlements. The Sung responded with more men, and assigned to the defensive
campaign three of its most esteemed commanders, Chang Shih-chieh (d. 1279),
Hsia Chen, and Li T’ing-chih (d. 1276). It even dispatched, at one point, the
assistant commander of the Palace Guard, Fan Wen-hu, to join in the defense.
Investments on both sides reached the extent that in 1271 the Sung deployed
over a hundred thousand men for a single naval maneuver. Despite investments
24 SS 46, p. 913.
25 On the Hsiang-yang conflict, see SS 450, pp. 13248–9; 451, p. 13272; Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 128,
pp. 3119–20; HTC (1958) 178, pp. 4875–6, 4881; 179, pp. 4883, 4886, 4888, 4890, 4898–4909;
180, pp. 4911–17; Fang Chen-hua, “Chia Ssu-tao yu¨ Hsiang Fan chih chan,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 21 No. 90.4
(1995), pp. 31–7; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 317–30; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih,
pp. 945–1133; Li Chen et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (Taipei, 1968), vol. 11, pp. 416–22;
Morris Rossabi, Khubilai khan: His life and times (Berkeley, Calif., 1988), pp. 82–6; Davis, Wind against
the mountain, pp. 48–59.
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of this magnitude, most battles in the region were won by the northern armies.
In late 1272, the Mongols intensified their assaults on Fan-ch’eng while dili-
gently patrolling Han waters to stop the flow of reinforcements from the
south. Early in 1273 Fan-ch’eng was overrun and its inhabitants slaughtered.
In the third month, Hsiang-yang escaped the same fate when its governor
surrendered. With these victories, the Mongols gained their long sought-after
objective of gaining easier access to the Hupei region and the south. This loss
triggered panic among officials in Lin-an.
Changing political currents at court
The chief councilor, Chia Ssu-tao, dominates most narratives of late Southern
Sung history. He was the strongest single political figure at Tu-tsung’s court;
however, other prominent men were emerging at the time who, disillusioned
with Chia Ssu-tao, joined ranks and attempted to terminate his fifteen-year
grip on power. Of the elder statesmen who worked to remove Chia from
power, Chiang Wan-li (1188–1275), Wang Yu¨eh (d. 1276), and Wang Ying-
lin (1223–96) are the most noteworthy.26 All three men had held metropolitan
posts under Li-tsung, which had given them valuable experience and political
exposure. Chiang Wan-li, a graduate of the Imperial University, served at
various censorial organizations before returning to the university to become
its chancellor. Tu-tsung promoted Chiang to assistant councilor in early 1265,
and he rose, in 1269, to serve for roughly a year as chief councilor. For the most
part, Chiang Wan-li cooperated with Chia Ssu-tao, rather than boycotting
Chia’s administration as many others did, but there were tensions between
the two men. When Chia Ssu-tao tendered his resignation in 1269, it was
perceived as a political ploy designed to enhance his status in the capital. As
the weeping emperor began to kneel down to beg him to stay, an astounded
and angry Chiang Wan-li forcibly propped up Tu-tsung and spoke harshly
to Chia Ssu-tao. Chiang also differed with the special military councilor over
Chia’s defense plans for Hsiang-yang, which to Chiang contained too much
caution and too little commitment. Few in the capital presented as great a
political threat to Chia Ssu-tao as Chiang Wan-li. His high-level association
with the Imperial University placed Chiang Wan-li in a position to mobilize
the influential institution against Chia Ssu-tao, should the need arise.
26 On their careers, see SS 418, pp. 12523–5, 12525–8; 438, pp. 12987–91; HTC (1958) 179, p. 4893;
Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 83–92; Jennifer W. Jay, A change in dynasties: Loyalism in thirteenth-
century China (Bellingham, Wash., 1991), pp. 13–60; chapters 3 and 4 of Charles B. Langley, “Wang
Yinglin (1223–96): A study in the political and intellectual history of the demise of Song” (diss., Indiana
University, 1980).
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Wang Yu¨eh, who had received his chin-shih in 1219, possessed even better
bureaucratic credentials than Chiang Wan-li, having served in several regional
as well as metropolitan posts. Wang enjoyed the esteem that came with service
to three consecutive emperors over the course of sixty years. A one-time advisor
to Tu-tsung before his accession, Wang Yu¨eh quickly rose after the accession to
assistant councilor. Historical records reveal nothing about his relationship
with Chia Ssu-tao, but in light of the respect Wang later enjoyed among Chia
Ssu-tao’s detractors, it is safe to assume that the two were not close political
allies.
The third in this group of elder statesmen, Wang Ying-lin, was the most
imposing. Having earned his chin-shih degree in 1241 and obtained the distinc-
tion of passing the “erudite literatus” (po-hsu¨eh hung-tz’u) examination in 1256,
he had served as managing officer at the Directorate of Education (Kuo-tzu
chien), as professor at the Military Academy, and as tutor to the heir apparent,
during Li-tsung’s reign. Aside from a political career that included distin-
guished secretarial appointments, he also was one of the most prolific scholars
of late Sung times. He was an accomplished lexicographer, classicist, and histo-
rian. Like Chiang Wan-li, Wang Ying-lin’s dissatisfaction with Chia Ssu-tao
stemmed chiefly from the councilor’s perceived indifference to the military
crisis unfolding at Hsiang-yang.
The presence at court of these highly independent and eminently qualified
and experienced officials denied Chia Ssu-tao the political monopoly that his
critics often associate with his tenure. But although Tu-tsung always had
alternative sources of advice, in the end he gave greatest credence to the counsel
of the individual who was least qualified academically. Yet after 1268, Chia
Ssu-tao, the man most trusted by the emperor, was in semiretirement, and
was required to attend court only once every six days and only once every ten
days after 1270. Given this arrangement, it is easy to see how the court gave
the appearance of being indifferent to the military menace in the north. Such
perceptions may have tormented the elder statesman, but they incited great
passions among the younger generation of aspiring officials. In many cases,
these passionate officials were men born and raised under conditions of war,
men who, after nearly forty-five years, still saw no end in sight.
Among the more prominent, and eventually most controversial, within this
younger group was Ch’en I-chung (chin-shih 1262).27 Ch’en, whose father was
a clerk, was born in humble circumstances in modern Wen-chou. He studied
at the Imperial University until 1256, when he was banished from the capital
for having joined five other students in publicly denouncing the authoritarian
27 SS 418, pp. 12529–32; HTC (1958) 175, p. 4764; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 63–94.
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Ting Ta-ch’u¨an. Permitted to return during Chia Ssu-tao’s administration,
Ch’en I-chung then placed second in the palace examination of 1262, and was
conferred chin-shih status. He served for most of Tu-tsung’s reign away from the
capital, but as a once-persecuted critic of an unpopular autocrat, Ch’en enjoyed
a considerable reputation in Lin-an and played a leading role in political affairs
in the last five years of the Sung dynasty.
Also commanding a considerable measure of respect among officials in the
capital was Ch’en Wen-lung (1232–77).28 A Fu-chou native who had studied
for a time at the Imperial University, Ch’en Wen-lung had taken top hon-
ors among the chin-shih graduates of 1269. Serving as a censor under Chia
Ssu-tao, he maintained a good measure of independence thanks to the defer-
ence accorded to him for his high ranking in the examinations. After the fall
of Hsiang-yang in early 1273, tensions among high-ranking officials mush-
roomed into confrontation. Ch’en Wen-lung, as censor, questioned the chief
councilor’s judgment in appointing inexperienced men to important military
posts and in pardoning cowardly commanders who had recently abandoned
their posts under enemy pressure. When Chia Ssu-tao had Ch’en banished
in the summer of 1273, Ch’en departed Lin-an with the sympathy of many
colleagues, for he had dared to express precisely the lack of confidence in Chia
Ssu-tao’s leadership that many felt.
Also among this list of passionate officials was Wen T’ien-hsiang (1236–
83), a native of Chi-chou3 (modern Chi-an in Kiangsi).29 Wen had earned
his chin-shih credentials, also with top honors, in 1256, and had impressed
Chief Examiner Wang Ying-lin with his stunning sense of history and civic
duty. Wen was imbued with idealism and a zeal to revitalize the dynasty,
but from the outset of his career he was on a collision course with the men
who dominated the court. In Wen’s view, these men were pragmatists prone
to compromise. In 1259, when the eunuch Tung Sung-ch’en proposed that
the capital be moved to a safer location along the coast, a furious Wen T’ien-
hsiang demanded Tung’s immediate execution. Wen T’ien-hsiang resented
the favored standing of Chia Ssu-tao at court. New tensions surfaced in the
1260s, and Wen T’ien-hsiang, under censorial indictment, was relieved of his
28 SS 451, pp. 13278–80; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, pp. 5a–6a; HTC (1958) 180, p. 4919; Chao chung lu
[Shou-shan ko ts’ung-shu 1922 ed.] (c. 1290; Taipei, 1968), pp. 31a–32a.
29 For biographical information, see SS 418, pp. 12533–40; Chao chung lu, pp. 17a–22b; HTC (1958)
175, p. 4789; 179, pp. 4895–6; Wen T’ien-hsiang, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’u¨an-chi, ed. Lo Hung-hsien,
(1560; Shanghai, 1936) 17, pp. 443–68; William A. Brown, Wen T’ien-hsiang: A biographical study of
a Sung patriot (San Francisco, 1986), pp. 95–225; chapter 5 of Davis, Wind against the mountain; Horst
Huber, “Wen T’ien-hsiang, 1236–1283: Vorstufen zum Versta¨ndnis seines Lebens” (diss., Universita¨t
zu Mu¨nchen, 1983), summarized in Horst Huber, “Wen T’ien-hsiang,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert
Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 3, pp. 1187–201.
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metropolitan responsibilities and for most of Tu-tsung’s reign served in various
regional posts. His reputation for no compromise in domestic politics and no
capitulation in foreign affairs made him a popular figure among Chia Ssu-tao’s
critics.
All six men, each eminently qualified for high office, were respected
within Lin-an’s growing cohort of disgruntled officials, and especially within
the Imperial University. The younger three tended to be more vociferous.
Throughout their careers, Ch’en I-chung and Wen T’ien-hsiang petitioned for
the execution of officials who, in their estimation, had betrayed the throne
through their ill-conceived advice. Execution was not in Sung times the usual
punishment for poor political counsel, the precedent of Han T’o-chou’s over-
throw notwithstanding. That radical views of this sort gained greater currency
in these last years of Tu-tsung’s reign reflects the desperation that prevailed.
There was a growing conviction among the idealists that, after years of toying
with grave problems, only radical measures could save the dynasty. Under these
conditions, Chia Ssu-tao became an easy scapegoat. Defeats on the borders were
blamed on ministerial neglect, not on the superiority of the enemy forces and
tactics. Defections of military and civilian officers in outlying regions were
blamed on ministerial misuse of rewards and punishments, not on fatigue fol-
lowing decades of fighting. The emperor’s inclination toward licentiousness
was blamed on his councilor’s evil influence, not on the predilections of the
emperor himself.
This is not to say that this dissatisfaction was unjustified. Chia Ssu-tao may
not have set out to destroy the dynasty, but certain of his actions had precisely
that effect and can be explained only in terms of gross lack of judgment.
For example, the peace envoy Hao Ching, dispatched south by Khubilai soon
after his accession as khaghan in 1260, was taken captive at the border and
remained in captivity for over fifteen years. The act is viewed by traditional
historians as having been a ploy by Chia Ssu-tao to conceal the terms of a secret
agreement containing embarrassing concessions he is alleged to have struck
with the Mongols at the height of their 1259 campaign against the Sung. The
charge is hard to credit and has been refuted by modern scholarship.30 Since
imprisoning an envoy for fifteen years only draws attention to the prisoner
and the circumstances surrounding his detention, it would have been far easier
simply to refuse him entry at the border on technical grounds, such as the use
of improper documents or incorrect protocol. Other reasons for imprisonment
were available as well. Sources suggest that Hao Ching had assisted northern
30 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 157, p. 3708; HTC (1958) 176, pp. 4796, 4802; Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–
1275),” pp. 226–9; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 260–5; Davis, Wind against the
mountain, pp. 30, 104–5.
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rulers in drafting maps of the south for use by military strategists, so the
Sung could have held him as a spy. Although Khubilai inquired repeatedly
about Hao Ching’s whereabouts, he did not press aggressively for his return.
His formal declaration of war against the Sung in 1274 alluded to the envoy’s
capture, but the two actions were separated by fifteen years and Mongol designs
on the Sung did not require a provocation. The detention of Hao Ching in
effect served to impede further peace talks. Chia Ssu-tao’s motive may have
been the naive hope that Hao Ching would be a bargaining chip in some future
negotiations between the two sides, but by initiating no new negotiations, he
gained nothing with the envoy’s prolonged detention. All the while, Chia’s
standing at home declined, for the action appeared senseless to contemporaries
as well.31
Although Chia Ssu-tao is portrayed by later writers as abjectly interested in
peace, under his leadership diplomatic activity was at its lowest since war with
the Mongols began in the 1230s. The two sides, locked in conflict, concentrated
instead on building up their arsenals. Khubilai was generally uninterested in
peace, although he proclaimed to Sung residents in the summer of 1269 that
he desired to avoid further warfare.32 This proclamation coincided, however,
with increasing pressure applied by his armies to the Han River valley and
the declaration was most likely used as a ploy to undermine Sung resolve.
Khubilai was consciously enhancing his political image by appearing less
martial, as evidenced by his elaborate renovations of Confucian temples at
Ch’u¨-fu (in Shantung) and Shang-tu (in Ch’ang-an), so his overtures of peace
may have grown out of efforts to present himself as transcending his warrior
origins. At the end of 1272, when the military commissioner for the Ching-hu
circuit, Li T’ing-chih, dispatched his own emissary to Mongol territory, the
envoy was politely but promptly returned. Yu¨an sources allude to negotiations
about border trade, but these did not abate the heightened level of hostilities.33
During the prolonged siege of Hsiang-yang, a negotiated settlement of some
sort to maintain the autonomy of the south may have been on the Sung agenda,
but it held no appeal to Khubilai.
Failure either to repulse the Mongols at Hsiang-yang or to entice them into
a peace treaty could have been enough to topple Chia Ssu-tao’s administration,
but Tu-tsung’s confidence in Chia seemed unshakable. However, in 1274 the
convergence of several disasters finally toppled Chia Ssu-tao. The first of these
setbacks was the escalation of Mongol attacks. Early in the year, Khubilai had
approved the mobilization of an additional one hundred thousand men for a
31 HTC (1958) 180, pp. 4927–8.
32 HTC (1958) 179, p. 4868.
33 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 7, pp. 143, 144; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 266–9.
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new campaign against the Sung. Once his forces had captured Hsiang-yang,
he decided to exploit the Sung’s vulnerability.34 A planned campaign against
Japan was postponed, and this freed more resources for the southern offensive
against the Sung. The declaration of full-scale war came in the sixth lunar
month, and the principal thrust of the attacks, initiated three months later,
was down the Han River valley. A-chu and Bayan of the Barin tribe, Khubilai’s
chief commanders, led the campaign.35 Their first target was Ying-chou3, a
sizable city roughly sixty miles down the Han River from Hsiang-yang. Sung
military investment in the area had been substantial, and the Mongol armies
faced formidable resistance. The old city, north of the river, had walls made of
stone and the new city, on the southern bank, was heavily fortified.36 Mongol
armies attacked Ying-chou3 from the north by water and from the south by
land. Chang Shih-chieh, one of the three prized commanders sent to defend the
region, offered stiff resistance, forcing Mongol troops to move farther down
the Han River to storm Hsin-ch’eng, Fu-chou3, the sister cities Han-k’ou and
Han-yang, and then O-chou (modern Wu-ch’ang). All five cities fell by the
end of the lunar year, early 1275, followed soon thereafter by Huang-chou and
Ch’i-chou2. This victory gave the Mongols their long-awaited access to the
Yangtze. Their horses were now able to cross the river by boat, and they were
positioned to move east toward the Sung capital, only some three hundred and
fifty miles away. Unfortunately for the Sung, the advancing Mongol army was
not its only problem.
A second crisis had struck in the summer of 1274, scarcely a month after
Khubilai announced his new campaign. The thirty-four-year-old Tu-tsung
fell victim to a chronic infection and died. Historical records reveal nothing
about the nature of his illness, nor is there any indication of a recent decline in
health. It apparently caught everyone by surprise. The immediate banishment
of his doctor under a cloud of controversy suggests that the malady grew
out of control only because of ill-advised medical care.37 Tu-tsung’s second
son, Chao Hsien, the only male born to him and Empress Ch’u¨an, succeeded
him on the ninth day of the seventh lunar month in 1274. The new emperor
was not yet four years old, prompting requests that Dowager Empress Hsieh,
the widow of Li-tsung, assist in governing from behind the bamboo screen.
Only once during the Northern Sung, under Che-tsung (r. 1085–1100), had a
34 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 8, p. 153; 128, pp. 3120–1.
35 For a brief explanation of the Barin tribe, see Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing, “Bayan,” in In the service of the Khan:
Eminent personalities of the early Mongol-Yu¨an period (1200–1300), ed. Igor de Rachewiltz et al. (Wiesbaden,
1993), p. 584.
36 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 127, p. 3100; HTC (1958) 180, pp. 4929–35; Li et al., Sung Yu¨an chan-shih,
pp. 1135–63; Li, Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, pp. 426–9.
37 SS 46, p. 918; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 14, pp. 3a–b.
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young child inherited the throne. The power vacuum this created had proved
highly destabilizing even then, at a time of relative peace. This time, with the
Southern Sung dynasty facing a major invasion from the west, the succession
of a powerless child had graver consequences. If Tu-tsung either had been
childless or had his sickness lasted longer, he and his advisors could have
selected a more competent heir through adoption, but this did not happen.
Political instability at the apex of Sung power was certain to undermine an
already weak decision-making process and exacerbate lethal tensions among
rival civil servants, men who did not, in the end, rise above their own partisan
interests for the sake of the empire.
a dynasty in retreat
The reign of Chao Hsien (1274–1276)
Tu-tsung was survived by three infant sons: Chao Shih (1269–78), born to
Consort Yang (1244–79); Chao Hsien (1271–unknown), born to Empress
Ch’u¨an (1241–1309); and Chao Ping (1272–9), born to Consort Yu¨.38 Prior
to Tu-tsung’s death, the emperor had not formally installed any one of them
as heir. According to the Sung dynastic history, the middle son succeeded “in
accordance with Tu-tsung’s last testament.” Secondary sources from the Ming
and Ch’ing dynasties generally insist that the accession of Chao Hsien was fixed
only after the death of Tu-tsung and that most court officials preferred the older
son, Chao Shih. But Chia Ssu-tao supported Chao Hsien, and Chia’s candidate
prevailed.39 The imperial testament (i-chao) was, in all likelihood, drafted by
both Grand Dowager Empress Hsieh and Empress Ch’u¨an in consultation with
chief councilors, including Chia Ssu-tao, soon after the emperor’s unexpected
death. The elevation of Chao Hsien was all but inevitable as he was the only son
born to the emperor’s primary wife, Empress Ch’u¨an. To vilify Chia Ssu-tao, as
traditional historians do, for favoring the second son merely to ensure his own
continued dominance, borders on the absurd. Chia could have just as easily
dominated Tu-tsung’s eldest son, Chao Shih, who was only five years old at
the time. This is not to say that Chia Ssu-tao acted altogether selflessly, for
support for Chao Hsien could have been used as a means to consolidate his
relationship with the young Dowager Empress Ch’u¨an. The senior dowager
38 SS 243, pp. 8658–62; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 7, pp. 6b–8b; Chao, Chao shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 69a–70a.
According to SS 46, p. 901, Tu-tsung had two other sons, both born in 1268, and both of whom
apparently died early. A genealogy for the Chao clan (Chao shih tsu-p’u) makes no reference to them, and
the naming pattern for the two is inconsistent with that for the other sons.
39 SS 417, p. 921; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 12a; K’o, Sung shih hsin-pien 14, p. 7a; HTC (1958) 180,
pp. 4926–7.
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empress, Hsieh Ch’iao, being nearly seventy and in ill health, could not be
expected to hold onto her regency for long and the now Dowager Empress
Ch’u¨an was her inevitable successor. A timely alliance with Dowager Empress
Ch’u¨an certainly had its political utility, and the sixty-one-year-old Chia Ssu-
tao, with his long history of close ties to palace women, probably understood
this better than most court officials.
Dowager Empress Hsieh (1210–83), the empress of Li-tsung since 1230,
was daughter of Hsieh Shen-fu, a chief councilor during the early reign of
Ning-tsung.40 Despite a forty-year marriage, she had the misfortune, like
many Sung empresses before her, of never enjoying her husband’s affection.
Li-tsung had initially favored Consort Chia, and later Consort Yen, and had par-
taken in many less orthodox affairs. Li-tsung appears largely to have neglected
his primary wife, whose betrothal had been arranged by his adoptive mother,
Dowager Empress Yang2. Dowager Empress Hsieh, although from an accom-
plished scholar-official family, had meticulously avoided involvement in polit-
ical matters during her husband’s long reign, with the notable exception of
voicing opposition to the 1259 proposal to relocate the capital along the coast.
Tu-tsung’s death and the accession of Chao Hsien had thrust her, as senior
dowager empress, into the political arena, although she reportedly accepted
her new prominence with great reluctance. Over the last few years of the
dynasty, Grand Dowager Empress Hsieh became a moderating force at court.
Far more responsible than either her husband or son, she cooperated with
the civil service and shunned extreme political positions. Assertive when the
need arose, she accepted counsel only after critical assessment, without alien-
ating officials through arbitrary decisions. Not given to political vendettas,
she could even be, much like her husband, magnanimous. For example, Chia
Ssu-tao was the brother of the woman whose favor had denied the dowa-
ger empress Li-tsung’s affections, but Dowager Empress Hsieh bore him no
grudge. On the contrary, as regent she chose to retain Chia Ssu-tao and often
proved his most loyal supporter before critics. Her chief concern was conti-
nuity and stability, and she showed little interest in replacing councilor-level
officers.
Changes in bureaucratic leadership were nonetheless underway in 1274,
even before Dowager Empress Hsieh’s regency. The rising star of the era was
Ch’en I-chung, the one-time university student with a reputation for unin-
hibited candor. From vice-minister of personnel, he rose to Bureau of Mili-
tary Affairs executive in 1273. Late that year he became assistant councilor
with concurrent authority over the Bureau of Military Affairs. Writers of the
40 SS 243, pp. 8658–60; Chao, Chao shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 69a. For greater detail on the dowager empress’s
regency, see Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 32–42.
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Sung dynastic history tried to portray Ch’en as a secret ally of Chia Ssu-tao
and, despite Ch’en’s militant rhetoric, as an utterly spineless character.41 This
characterization seems far-fetched. In 1273, while still with the Ministry of
Personnel, Ch’en I-chung challenged the wisdom of Chia Ssu-tao’s pardon of
Fan Wen-hu, the commander who deserted at Hsiang-yang, and demanded
Fan’s execution.42 Ch’en’s actions, both then and later, confirmed that Ch’en
I-chung considered the empire’s inability to repel Mongol forces to be related
to the inadequate discipline of commanders, a problem that Chen blamed on
Chia Ssu-tao’s tendency to compromise. Ch’en I-chung may have been unable
to live up to the high standard he set for others, he may have lacked the courage
to be the militant that he aspired to be, but this hardly makes him a Chia
Ssu-tao partisan. Not only did Ch’en I-chung believe his own rhetoric, con-
temporaries apparently did as well. Wang Yu¨eh, for example, who had risen
in late 1274 to become chief councilor of the left, generally sympathized with
Ch’en I-chung despite their personal differences. The new councilor of the
right, Chang Chien2, was more nondescript in character. A former subordi-
nate of Wang Yu¨eh at the military bureau, he probably owed his promotion to
Wang Yu¨eh’s ascent.43 Such promotions, made by the empress but probably
with input from Chia Ssu-tao, suggest that the court, despite the handicaps of
a heldover special councilor and a boy emperor, continued to attract politically
diverse talent. Grand Dowager Empress Hsieh was at least as successful as
her stepson, Tu-tsung, at diversifying the civil service at the top, and instill-
ing in politically alienated officials some hope for change. This was no mean
accomplishment in such difficult times.
Dowager Empress Hsieh, while recognizing the dynasty’s great needs, saw
no reason to abandon Chia Ssu-tao. Her support left only one person capable of
bringing down the special councilor, the special councilor himself. The catalyst
for this event was a succession of military setbacks in 1274–5. As military
coordinator, Chia Ssu-tao’s judgment had come into question some years earlier
when he had reassigned his brother-in-law Fan Wen-hu, a commander for the
lower Huai, to the Ching-hu region to bolster the forces at Hsiang-yang.44
Leading an army of reportedly a hundred thousand men, Fan had been defeated
by the Mongol commander A-chu in the summer of 1271. Hsiang-yang held
out, but eventually fell in 1273. Most of Fan’s soldiers had perished, and he
came perilously close to meeting the same fate himself. The Sung court decided,
41 SS 418, p. 12530.
42 HTC (1958) 180, p. 4919.
43 SS 418, pp. 12528–9.
44 HTC (1958) 179, p. 4903; Li et al., Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 986–8, 1179–82; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai
chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, p. 419.
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despite the magnitude of the defeat, on a demotion of only one rank, and Fan
was reassigned as prefect of An-ch’ing, a strategic city east of Hsiang-yang
on the Yangtze River. The lax discipline and the implicit nepotism in Chia’s
handling of Fan’s dismissal enraged Ch’en I-chung and others. Chia Ssu-tao’s
credibility suffered further in early 1275 when the same Fan Wen-hu, offering
no resistance, surrendered An-ch’ing to the Mongols.45 Less than two weeks
later came the most paralyzing defeat of the entire Southern Sung.
The military setbacks of late 1274 had so undermined morale in the south
that something dramatic needed to be done to stem the enemy’s tide of victory,
and to restore confidence in the dynasty and its armies. Chia Ssu-tao, despite
his sixty-one years, decided to direct personally a vast and desperate campaign
aimed at driving the Mongols back across the Yangtze and Han rivers.46
Chia chose to focus his main counterattack on Chiang-chou, a city along the
northwestern tip of P’o-yang Lake that had recently fallen to the Mongols.
Clearly designed as a show of Sung strength, the plan involved spending some
100,000 ounces of gold, 500,000 ounces of silver, and 10 million strings of cash
on the counteroffensive. To further intimidate the Mongol troops, the court
reportedly placed under the general command of Chia Ssu-tao a million men,
mostly naval forces. Intimidation of the enemy entailed some exaggeration
of troop levels, so the boast of a million men cannot be taken at face value.
Other sources inform us that the entire Sung army contained no more than
700,000 regulars, and surely the Sung court did not commit its whole army in
a single campaign. Yu¨an sources suggest the Sung invested 130,000 men in
the battle, probably a more accurate estimate.47 Even so, 130,000 represented
nearly one-fifth of the Sung army, an indication of the importance attached
to this particular campaign. Most of the troops were placed under the direct
command of Sun Hu-ch’en (d. 1276), who quickly came under attack from the
combined forces of Bayan and A-chu along the Yangtze River near Ting-chia-
chou downstream from Ch’ih-chou (modern Kuei-ch’ih, in Anhwei). Sun’s men
bore the brunt of the Mongol counterattack, and when they were defeated the
entire campaign was doomed. Chia Ssu-tao, himself only twenty-five miles to
the east of Wu-hu on the Yangtze River, responded by fleeing downstream
to Yang-chou. With the defeat so decisive, Chia Ssu-tao was more than just
personally humiliated; the prospect of Mongol armies pressing east toward
the Sung capital seemed imminent. Chia proposed, apparently in an urgent
45 HTC (1958) 181, p. 4939. Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 53–4, 76–7.
46 On the campaign, see Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 8, p. 162; 127, pp. 3104–5; 128, p. 3122; HTC (1958)
180, pp. 4934–5; 181, pp. 4942–3; Liu Min-chung, P’ing Sung lu [Shou-shan ko ts’ung-shu 1922 ed.]
(1304; Taipei, 1968) 1, pp. 8b–9a; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 368–74; Li, Sung Yu¨an
chan-shih, pp. 1182–9; Li, Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, pp. 429–31.
47 Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, p. 7b; Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 127, p. 3104.
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letter sent from Yang-chou, that the court be moved to some more defensible
location.48
The option of relocating the capital had already been considered intermit-
tently for many years, indeed since the outset of the Southern Sung period.
A coastal location such as Ming-chou (modern Ning-po) seemed preferable to
many because it was farther east and afforded easy access to the ocean, should
flight become necessary. With the Mongols now having invaded the Chiang-
nan East circuit, they were within striking distance of Lin-an via Wu-hu. Chia
Ssu-tao’s proposal sparked heated debate. Chief Councilor Wang Yu¨eh offered
his vigorous opposition, but Assistant Councilor Ch’en I-chung was so out-
raged that he demanded death for Chia Ssu-tao,49 who appears not yet to have
returned to Lin-an. Dowager Empress Hsieh did not endorse relocation of the
capital for fear of “disturbing the people.” With Chia Ssu-tao not on hand to
make his case, the idea went no further. A forgiving dowager empress firmly
rejected calls for Chia’s execution. Noting his years of meritorious service,
she ordered his dismissal in the second lunar month of 1275. The purge of
an unpopular Chia Ssu-tao was hardly sufficient to restore the civil service’s
confidence in the dynasty.
In the early months of 1275 the important Yangtze cities of O-chou,
Huang-chou, Ch’i-chou2, Chiang-chou, and An-ch’ing had been captured
by the Mongols. A few months after this, the defeat of Chia Ssu-tao’s forces at
Wu-hu touched off the surrenders of over a dozen more major prefectures in
central and eastern Sung territory.50 These included Jao-chou, Lung-hsing2,
Lin-chiang, Wu-wei, T’an-chou, and most of the important cities along the
lower reaches of the Huai River and the stretch of the Yangtze River around
P’o-yang Lake. The Mongols concentrated on capturing larger cities, and by
late spring, they began to seize strategically vital cities in the east as well,
including Ch’u-chou, Chien-k’ang (Nan-ching), Chen-chiang, Ch’ang-chou,
Wu-hsi, and P’ing-chiang (Su-chou). The Sung also suffered defeats at the
Ning-kuo and Kuang-te commanderies, roughly sixty miles northwest of Lin-
an. Most of these cities fell without offering any significant resistance. They
were relinquished by civilian or military officers who, when not surrendering
to the Mongols, had simply fled their posts. Desertion was not confined to the
regional level; it infected the capital as well.
Earlier in 1275, when defeat at O-chou had posed a direct threat to the cap-
ital, the government issued a crisis call to regional officials and military com-
manders. The call to “rally on behalf the emperor” (ch’in-wang) drew responses
48 SS 47, p. 926; 474, p. 13786; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 7a.
49 SS 474, p. 13786; HTC (1958) 181, pp. 4944, 4946; chapter 3 of Davis, Wind against the mountain.
50 Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1178–80, 1189–96.
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from only a few, among them Wen T’ien-hsiang, then prefect of Kan-chou
(in southern Kiangsi); Li T’ing-chih, commissioner for the Huai region; and
Chang Shih-chieh, a leading commander for the Ching-hu North frontier.51
The court’s agonizing sense of abandonment grew all the more acute a few
months later, when leading metropolitan officials began to flee. Councilor of
the Right Chang Chien2, nervous about the Mongol advance and nettled by
persistent squabbles between Wang Yu¨eh and Ch’en I-chung, abandoned his
office and fled the capital. Following his lead were three high-level executives
at the Bureau of Military Affairs, a ranking censorial official, and numerous
circuit-level chief administrators.52
These internal and external pressures aggravated tensions at court. Once
again a call to relocate the capital was made, this time by Han Chen2, chief
commander of the Palace Guard and an alleged ally of Chia Ssu-tao. An iras-
cible, seemingly crazed Ch’en I-chung responded by secretly ordering Han
Chen2’s death by bludgeoning.53 Later it was charged that Han Chen2 had
intended to press the relocation issue by force of arms, in effect, making the
court the hostage of its generals. This charge against Han Chen2 was appar-
ently intended to justify the actions of Ch’en I-chung, who was new to power
and zealous at guarding it. Ch’en I-chung may have intended to put an end
to defeatism at the capital, but his methods invited more instability. Apart
from aggravating an already ill-humored Wang Yu¨eh, the incident touched
off a nighttime mutiny in the Palace Guard. Furious subordinates of Han
Chen2 marched in protest on the southern gate of the imperial city and pelted
the palaces inside the walls with incendiary devices. The mutiny was quelled
by the next morning, but at the cost of a sizable number of guardsmen who
defected to the Mongols.
Dowager Empress Hsieh’s frustration was captured rather succinctly in
a palace notice posted on her orders. It read: “Our dynasty for over three
hundred years has treated scholar-officials with propriety (li3). While the new
successor [Chao Hsien] and I have met with assorted family hardships, you
subjects both high and low have offered no proposals whatsoever for saving
the empire. Within [the capital], officials forsake their commissions and vacate
posts. Away [from the capital], responsible officers relinquish their seals and
abandon cities. Censorial officers are incapable of investigating and indicting
for me, and the two or three at the councilor level cannot lead and direct the
51 SS 47, p. 924; 418, p. 12534; 421, p. 12601; 451, p. 13272; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1222–3;
chapter 3 of Davis, Wind against the mountain.
52 SS 47, p. 928.
53 SS 47, pp. 927, 931; 418, p. 12530; Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 8, p. 163; HTC (1958) 181, p. 4947; Davis,
Wind against the mountain, pp. 72–5.
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efforts of the whole. Superficially, they cooperate [with me], but one after the
other they flee by night.”54 Her biting rebuke reads as a sad commentary on
the breakdown between the beleaguered regent and child-emperor and his
court officials.
Desperately trying to restore order in the capital, Dowager Empress Hsieh
moved quickly to fill the vacancies created by recent desertions. Chang Chien2,
who had fled Lin-an shortly after Chia Ssu-tao’s dismissal and who had refused
repeated orders to return, fell under the indictment of Censor Wang Ying-
lin. Ch’en I-chung replaced him as councilor of the right. The special post
of military councilor, formerly held by Chia Ssu-tao, was not for the moment
revived. The dowager empress had decided instead to entrust direction of the
armed forces to her two chief councilors, Ch’en I-chung and Wang Yu¨eh. But,
Ch’en I-chung had already emerged as the dowager empress’s premier court
advisor, if only by default. Wang Yu¨eh may have been the senior statesman,
but he had long sought to retire, ostensibly for reasons of health. The court
was adamant in refusing the request, in part because it desperately needed
continuity at the top of the bureaucracy, and in part because of the negative
effect on morale that another executive’s departure would have. Only by quietly
leaving the capital for his native Shao-hsing did Wang manage, in spring
1275, to negotiate his reassignment as distinguished pacification and bandit-
suppressing commissioner for Che-hsi and Chiang-nan East, the metropolitan
circuit.55 Wang’s departure, at the height of Lin-an’s military crisis, created
a political vacuum that was filled by Ch’en I-chung. Wang Yu¨eh did not
disappear altogether, however. In summer 1275, he served briefly as councilor
of the left and special military councilor in succession to Chia Ssu-tao. But
he and Ch’en I-chung seemed perennially at odds, often belaboring the most
trivial of matters, prompting the dowager empress, in July, to dismiss them
both. By November, she had recalled Ch’en I-chung as chief councilor. Wang
Yu¨eh died early the next year.
Perhaps under other leadership, the life-or-death struggle might have
united Sung officials against the Mongol invasion. But morale continued to
sink as Sung officials turned on one another. Ch’en I-chung, in assassinating
Han Chen2, had contributed much to the vindictive and murderous climate
of the day.56 Ch’en I-chung had expressed the desire of many in the capital
in demanding Chia Ssu-tao’s execution, following his fall from power. Wang
Ying-lin and Wang Yu¨eh made similar pleas, and were soon joined by stu-
dents at Lin-an’s three universities, very likely at Wang Yu¨eh’s inspiration.
54 HTC (1958) 181, p. 4950; Davis, Wind against the mountain, p. 75.
55 SS 418, p. 12527.
56 SS 474, pp. 13786–7; HTC (1958) 181, pp. 4945–6, 4948, 4958–9; 182, pp. 4964, 4970.
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The court wasted much valuable time and energy debating Chia Ssu-tao’s fate.
In principle, Dowager Empress Hsieh opposed punishment of any sort, but
under mounting pressure she acceded to progressively more severe forms of
banishment and the confiscation of Chia family property. Despite her prefer-
ence for leniency, Chia Ssu-tao was assassinated in October 1275 at Chang-chou
(Fu-chien) by the court-designated sheriff charged with his custody. Responsi-
bility for the order remains unclear, although explicit palace authorization for
it appears unlikely. The murder contravened Dowager Empress Hsieh’s ear-
lier amnesty, and the two councilors who most despised Chia Ssu-tao, Wang
Yu¨eh and Ch’en I-chung, were both temporarily out of office. Later, the court
ordered the arrest and imprisonment of the sheriff responsible for the death.
The arrest was made personally by Ch’en I-chung, who happened to be visit-
ing the region. Writers of the Sung dynastic history implicate Tu-tsung’s father,
Chao Yu¨-jui, in Chia’s assassination because he had held Chia Ssu-tao person-
ally responsible for his son’s poor medical care and untimely death and had
decided to exact revenge.57 Unauthorized and unwarranted, perhaps, but the
assassination of Chia Ssu-tao disturbed few bureaucrats. Like Han T’o-chou
seven decades earlier, Chia Ssu-tao had become a convenient scapegoat for a
time without hope.
More agonizing and potentially destructive than this preoccupation with
vendetta, was the inability of Dowager Empress Hsieh’s executive officials to
cooperate with each other. One possible solution open to the dowager empress
was to replace the councilors, but the times were ill suited for overhauling
the bureaucracy and the pool of candidates diminished daily as official ranks
thinned out. She had ultimately decided to sacrifice the aged Wang Yu¨eh, at
which point Ch’en I-chung was summoned to return to the capital. Ch’en’s
whereabouts for most of that summer of 1275 are uncertain, as are his motives
for staying away. A student at the Metropolitan Academy, purportedly at Wang
Yu¨eh’s prompting, launched a caustic assault on Ch’en I-chung’s official record,
accusing him of being no better than Chia Ssu-tao. In support of Ch’en I-chung,
the dowager empress ordered the student arrested.58 Ch’en’s period of with-
drawal may have afforded him an opportunity to brood, while demonstrating
his value to the empire. Ch’en I-chung lingered in his native Wen-chou and
then was in Fu-chou, perhaps working unofficially with coastal defense forces.
He returned to Lin-an in the tenth lunar month as councilor of the right.
In his absence, Liu Meng-yen had served as chief councilor, but allegations
of nepotism drew the censure of Wang Ying-lin and forced Liu into retire-
ment.59 This left Wang Ying-lin, whose previous indictments of Councilors
57 SS 474, p. 13787; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 243.
58 HTC (1958) 181, pp. 4960–1.
59 SS 438, p. 12991.
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Chia Ssu-tao, Chang Chien2, and Wang Yu¨eh had drawn much court atten-
tion, as a rising star in Lin-an. Nothing could have pleased Ch’en I-chung
more, for Wang Ying-lin had supported him earlier over the controversial
execution of Han Chen2, and it appeared that Wang and Ch’en shared many
other views. Ch’en I-chung must have also taken heart in the advancement
to assistant councilor of another articulate critic of Chia Ssu-tao’s leadership,
Ch’en Wen-lung. Ch’en I-chung thus returned to the capital with a gener-
ally supportive body of subordinates and the full confidence of the dowager
empress.
The fall of Lin-an
The summer months of 1275 had brought something of a respite to the Sung
court. Mongol armies, unaccustomed to the humid summers of the south and
taking stock of their recent victories, withdrew from many of the cities recently
conquered in the Sung interior. In early summer, Khubilai had summoned
Bayan north for consultations to Peking and later to Shang-tu. This respite
enabled the Sung to stage something of a rally.
In the strategically vital region of the lower Yangtze River, the Sung recap-
tured, in whole or in part, Yang-chou, Ch’ang-chou, P’ing-chiang, and Kuang-
te. In central Sung territory, they recovered Jao-chou, O-chou, and many
subprefectures near heavily contested cities.60 Mongol control in the south
was still firm and extensive, especially in central Sung territory, but Sung
defenders did not remain inactive while the Mongol forces consolidated their
positions. Initially, the Sung court offered a general amnesty to high-level
regional officials who had recently deserted their posts, but when this was
ordered in April and May, the policy yielded unimpressive results. The court
subsequently threatened capital punishment for all deserters,61 but this proved
equally futile. Having failed to substantially reclaim lost men and territory,
the court decided to cling to what territory remained and stave off the Mongol
armies when they attempted to drive east. Crucial to this strategy was the
city of Yang-chou, sitting to the north of the Yangtze River opposite Chen-
chiang. The Sung assigned its two prized commanders, Chang Shih-chieh and
Li T’ing-chih, to the defense of Yang-chou, which had fallen briefly to Mongol
armies in the spring but was recovered soon after.
A further disaster occurred on the Yangtze in the seventh lunar month of
1275. Sung forces under Chang Shih-chieh attempted to blockade the river at
Chiao-shan below Chen-chiang to deny the Mongol naval forces access to the
sea. The Sung moored a huge fleet of big ships across the river, anchored and
60 Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1210–7.
61 SS 47, pp. 927–8, 930.
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chained together, and heavily protected. From their shore base at Chiao-shan
the much smaller Mongol fleet attacked them with fire ships and incendiary
arrows. Many of the immobilized ships burned, and at the same time Mongol
land forces attacked the shore installations. The Mongols won an overwhelming
victory, and captured seven hundred seagoing ships, which they could now
deploy on the open sea. The Sung lost sixteen thousand men, and as many
were taken captive.62
The Mongols pressed Yang-chou for much of the summer, and launched an
all-out campaign in the autumn of 1275, all to no avail. Yang-chou would,
in the end, hold out even after the capital Lin-an had fallen.63 The same was
true for neighboring Chen-chou2, which resisted repeated assaults. The Sung
also hoped to strengthen defenses in the lower Yangtze River that autumn by
appointing the increasingly prominent Wen T’ien-hsiang as prefect of P’ing-
chiang (Su-chou), which had only recently been recaptured. A former minister
of war, Wen T’ien-hsiang had gained notable success in recruiting local men
for regional armies in other parts of the empire. He seemed to possess the
organizational skills and the strength of character needed to keep the enemy
at bay, a mission vital to the security of the capital. But despite such positive
actions by the Sung court, previous Mongol attacks had already decimated too
many units and left too many gaps in defenses for the efforts of one summer
to restore Sung military effectiveness.
During the summer, Bayan, now chief minister, met with Khubilai to for-
mulate their strategy to finish the campaign against the Sung. They decided to
press ahead with a devastating three-pronged assault originating from Chien-
k’ang (Nanking), on the south bank of the Yangtze River and ultimately
directed against Lin-an.64 Upon returning to the Yangtze front in December
1275, Bayan personally joined the siege of Ch’ang-chou, while A-chu aug-
mented Mongol forces attacking Yang-chou. A-tz’u-han led the advance from
west of Lin-an with an assault on Kuang-te commandery. Ch’ang-chou fell
late in the year, following many months of stiff resistance, and Bayan ordered
a general massacre of its populace. It was a tactic employed by the Mongols
to intimidate neighboring cities by threatening the same for any other hold-
outs. News of the massacre created a serious rift between Sung commanders
determined to resist and city dwellers desperate to survive. As the campaign
continued in the Yangtze delta, Chiang-yin commandery, about a hundred
miles northeast of Lin-an, surrendered to the armies of Tung Wen-ping. The
62 HTC (1958) 181, p. 4958; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 80–2.
63 Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1294–1305; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 101–3.
64 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 8, p. 169; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1240–53; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng
shih (1968), vol. 11, pp. 435–9, 449–50.
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main force advanced along the line of the Grand Canal; Wu-hsi and P’ing-
chiang (Su-chou) fell to Bayan after the Sung court had summoned Wen T’ien-
hsiang back to the capital. The city of Hu-chou and Tu-sung Pass, the strategic
pass roughly forty miles west of the capital, fell to the armies of A-tz’u-han.
These gains were strategically invaluable to the Mongols. Chiang-yin lay at
the mouth of the Yangtze, and its capitulation gave the Mongols unobstructed
access to the Yellow Sea and Hang-chou Bay. The Mongols, their fleet increased
by the seven hundred ships captured at Chiao-shan, could now approach the
Sung capital by sea. The capture of P’ing-chiang and Hu-chou consolidated
the Mongol hold on the area around Lake T’ai, north of the capital. Control
of Tu-sung Pass secured the Mongol western flank. As the year (1275) came
to an end, the enemy converged on Lin-an. The remaining Sung leadership in
Lin-an had to decide whether to retreat farther south or to stand firm. With
a minimum of from thirty thousand to forty thousand troops available and
irregulars numbering several times that, defeat was far from inevitable.65 The
alternative was to negotiate by making some irrefusably generous offer and
stall for time.
It was only during Chia Ssu-tao’s last month in power in early 1275, follow-
ing his defeat at Wu-hu, that a peace envoy, Sung Ching, was dispatched to the
camp of Bayan.66 On the eve of Chia Ssu-tao’s formal dismissal from office, the
northern envoy Hao Ching, whom the Sung had continued to hold captive,
was released and allowed to return home. The commissioning of Sung Ching
is portrayed in the Sung dynastic history as the work of Chia Ssu-tao, and the
release of Hao Ching as an independent gesture by the court. In fact, both acts
took place during Chia Ssu-tao’s absence from the capital, which leaves Wang
Yu¨eh and Ch’en I-chung as the likely initiators of peace overtures. Unfortu-
nately, their timidity doomed the mission. Despite the fact that Bayan’s armies
had by then already reached Ch’ih-chou, some one hundred and sixty miles
from Lin-an, the Sung offered only a modest payment of tribute in exchange
for unconditional withdrawal. The Mongols rejected the offer, but Khubilai
appears to have dispatched an envoy a month later. The message he carried
will never be known, for Sung officers assassinated him at the border. The
Sung court, apologizing for the unauthorized act, approached Bayan in May
with new peace proposals, but Bayan’s return envoy was also assassinated. The
Sung apparently made no special effort to protect emissaries from the north,
having concluded that the Mongols were not acting in good faith. As a rule,
the Sung court turned to negotiation only under severe military pressure from
65 HTC (1958) 182, p. 4969.
66 On peace talks, see SS 47, pp. 926, 936–7; Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 8, pp. 161, 165, 171; 9, pp. 175–6;
126, p. 3097; 127, pp. 3104–9; HTC (1958) 181, pp. 4944, 4953–4; 182, pp. 4970, 4975–6.
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the Mongols, and then only as a delaying tactic. The militant Ch’en I-chung
and Wang Ying-lin could scarcely countenance the kind of compromises that a
peace treaty, negotiated from a position of weakness, would have entailed. The
Sung court delayed reopening talks until year’s end, when Bayan’s campaign
directed against Lin-an was already underway. In the twelfth lunar month (early
1276) there was a great flurry of diplomatic activity. The Mongols demanded
outright surrender. The Sung made concessions on issues of protocol but lit-
tle else. With the Mongols having a clear military advantage and the Sung
attempting to preserve whatever autonomy it could, diplomacy did not work.
The position of the Sung empire deteriorated rapidly in early 1276.67 In a
three-pronged attack, Bayan’s troops closed in on the capital with the conquests
of Chia-hsing, An-chi (Wu-hsing), and Ch’ang-an Garrison (Lin-an’s northern
suburbs), while the enemy troops of Tung Wen-ping made an amphibious
landing on the coast north of Lin-an, and approached the capital from the
northeast via Hang-chou Bay. On the third prong, A-tz’u-han’s troops closed
in from the west. By the middle of the first lunar month, all three armies
converged at Kao-t’ing Mountain in the suburbs of Lin-an. Sung forces had
meanwhile suffered setbacks in the heart of modern Hunan and in northern
Kwangsi province. Defeat at T’an-chou (Ch’ang-sha), a city that had fought off
attacking armies for five months and endured tremendous losses, was quickly
followed by the fall of Yung-chou2, Ch’u¨an-chou2, and Kuei-yang (Kuei-lin),
and other cities in central and southern Sung territory. Mongol armies now
had secured control of the Yangtze valley, and were positioned for the final
assault on Lin-an.
News of the recent defeats touched off a new wave of desertions by leading
civil servants at the Sung court.68 Chief Councilor of the Left Liu Meng-yen and
Minister of Rites Wang Ying-lin fled at the close of 1275. Their resignations
having been rejected, they did not respond to court messengers appealing for
their return. Less than two months later, after the fall of Chia-hsing, Assistant
Councilors Ch’en Wen-lung and Ch’ang Mao (d. 1282), Bureau of Military
Affairs officers Huang Yung and Hsia Shih-lin, various censorial officials, and
many others joined the long list of high-ranking deserters. The situation
became so acute that by early February court attendance had fallen to fewer
than ten civilian officials. There were also military desertions in and around
the capital. News of Mongol atrocities at nearby Ch’ang-chou panicked Lin-
an’s scholar-officials. Anticipating a protracted battle over the capital, some
fled because they wished to be spared the pain of either violent death or
67 HTC (1958) 182, pp. 4962–75; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 404–9; Li, Sung Yu¨an
chan-shih, pp. 1247–53.
68 SS 47, pp. 935–7; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 175, p. 8b.
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humiliating captivity. Others left out of frustration with the leadership of
Ch’en I-chung, and his inability to devise an effective military response to the
Mongol advance and refusal to devise a strategy for retreat should Sung armies
be unable to hold Lin-an. Wen T’ien-hsiang and Chang Shih-chieh, the court’s
leading commanders by early 1276, proposed that the royal family prepare
to board ships in anticipation of a tactical retreat.69 Ch’en I-chung opposed
the move, purportedly because he still hoped a negotiated settlement could
be worked out, but perhaps because he could not accept the notion of retreat.
Even at the very end, Ch’en could only think of offering the Mongols meager
concessions. Only after Lu Hsiu-fu (1238–79), vice-minister at the Court of
the Imperial Clan, headed what turned out to be the final mission to the camp
of Bayan, producing no tangible results for a settlement, did Ch’en I-chung
finally endorse the withdrawal from Lin-an. Dowager Empress Hsieh at first
rejected the idea, as she had previously, but after a day’s reconsideration she
agreed. The night before, on 4 February, Ch’en I-chung had fled to his native
Wen-chou. The envoy, Lu Hsiu-fu, had already arranged a personal meeting the
next day between the chief councilor Ch’en and Bayan at Ch’ang-an Garrison
to discuss terms of surrender. The mission must have terrified Ch’en I-chung,
and understandably so in light of the high mortality among recent envoys.
Ch’en’s departure forced the court to nominate someone else for this dangerous
task.
Having lost most of her civil service, Dowager Empress Hsieh had no great
pool of candidates from which to select a new chief councilor and head negotia-
tor. Among the more accomplished of those available was Wen T’ien-hsiang.
He became chief councilor and general commander of Sung armies on 5 Febru-
ary 1276. A day later, Wu Chien, councilor of the left since mid-January, and
Chia Yu¨-ch’ing (d. 1276), the recently named prefect of Lin-an, accompanied
Wen T’ien-hsiang to meet Bayan at his camp just north of Lin-an.70 At this
point, the Mongols had largely cut off Lin-an from the remaining Sung empire
and were ready to take the city, yet the Sung mediators offered nothing new
and were clearly only stalling for time. Bayan promptly sent the delegation
home. He chose to retain Wen T’ien-hsiang, after having had a verbal con-
frontation with him that left Bayan angered and suspicious. Wen remained
his captive for over a month. In the interim, on 22 February, the Sung court
recommissioned the former envoys, Chia Yu¨-ch’ing, who now replaced Wen
T’ien-hsiang as councilor of the right, and Wu Chien, to negotiate surrender.
With Mongol armies already positioned along the Ch’ien-t’ang River, facing
69 SS 451, p. 13273; HTC (1958) 182, p. 4976.
70 On the mission, see HTC (1958) 182, p. 4977; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’u¨an-chi 17,
pp. 453–4; 19, pp. 498–9; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1257–60.
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the capital, nothing but unconditional surrender was acceptable. On 22 March,
the twelfth day of the third lunar month, Bayan himself entered Lin-an to direct
the occupation. The million or so inhabitants of the Sung capital had been
spared a violent and destructive assault.71
The campaign against Lin-an was among the most carefully devised and
least violent conquests in Mongol history. Not only did Bayan coordinate the
movements of the three separate armies to ensure their convergence on the Kao-
t’ing Mountains, he enforced a high degree of discipline on those armies.72 On
5 February, he had issued orders strictly forbidding soldiers from entering Lin-
an and threatening severe punishment for all transgressors. Twelve days later,
after the Sung court issued its surrender decree, Bayan dispatched commanders
of two lesser armies, Meng-ku-tai and Fan Wen-hu, a Mongol and a Sung
deserter, to enter the capital and prepare for an orderly transition of power.
He intentionally kept back the more powerful generals A-tz’u-han and Tung
Wen-ping. In another week and a half, Sung eunuchs were instructed to begin
collecting palace valuables and imperial paraphernalia. On the 28th of March,
nearly two months after his arrival in the city’s suburbs, Bayan paraded through
the gates of Lin-an as conqueror of the once great Sung dynasty. Such restraint
may not have been expected of a warrior famed for depopulating entire cities,
but the circumstances of the occupation of the Sung capital made it expedient.
There are reports that mass killings had taken place in the vicinity of Lin-an as
the Mongol armies closed in. Bayan may have sought to forestall more violence,
by delaying the takeover.73 In addition, some sources suggest that as troops
approached Lin-an they began to quarrel over the spoils that awaited them.
Bayan may have acted to stem further problems within his own ranks while
protecting the palaces from pillaging. Palace valuables were important to him,
for he collected the treasures and dutifully forwarded them all to Khubilai.
The valuables were later distributed among Mongol princes like any other
booty.
At their Shang-tu meeting in the summer of 1276, Bayan and Khubilai had
apparently decided on the fate of the Chao imperial family. The position had
been articulated early on in the negotiations of 1275–6. In exchange for the
Sung surrender, there would be no destruction of the state altars – “gods of soil
and grain” (she-chi). The Chao ancestor cult would not be destroyed, and the
imperial family would be spared in accordance with Chinese tradition to enable
imperial descendants to continue offering sacrifices to the ancestral emperors.
71 For details about the surrender, occupation, and treatment of conquered Sung adherents, see Hsiao,
“Bayan,” pp. 595–6.
72 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 127, p. 3109; HTC (1958) 182, pp. 4975–81.
73 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 9, p. 177; HTC (1958) 182, p. 4977.
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To a child-emperor and an aging dowager empress, for whom political power
mattered little anyway, this must have been an important factor in the decision
to submit without resistance. Not all palace residents took consolation in such
promises. Reportedly a hundred palace women, in fear of being raped and
enslaved, committed suicide on the eve of Bayan’s triumphal entry into Lin-
an.74 The incident may also be related to their learning that exile to the north
was the fate awaiting them and other palace residents. All the eunuchs were
roped together and placed under armed guard, so that they could ensure the
safety of the women during the journey of over six hundred miles from Lin-
an to Peking and beyond. Many palace women chose suicide en route. Other
palace women committed suicide after they arrived in Peking out of fidelity
to spouses long deceased. Most palace attendants accepted Mongol bondage,
and Bayan spared members of the imperial family the humiliation of chains as
they journeyed north.75
Forced removal of palace residents had previously occurred when a new
dynasty came to power. To ward off a political or military challenge, new
rulers had uprooted the elderly and powerful from their former political base
and sent them to isolated places where they could be monitored.76 In earlier
times, forced migration had sometimes involved hundreds of thousands of
persons. The Mongol action, which involved no more than a thousand cap-
tives, is noteworthy in one regard. Up to a hundred students at the three
universities – only a fraction of the total student population, which stood at
three thousand to four thousand – accompanied the imperial entourage on
its trek north.77 Their trip was voluntary for some, involuntary for others,
but in the face of wholesale abandonment of the court by its most eminent
officials, students seemed intent on making a strong statement of their com-
mitment to the principle of loyalty. They likely drew inspiration from the
chancellor of the university system, Yang Wen-chung (chin-shih 1253), and a
former university official, Kao Ying-sun, two of only a handful of officials still
in attendance at court during its last days.78 Most of the students, like most
lesser palace consorts and female servants, were eventually permitted to return
south, while the prominent individuals were encouraged to remain in the
north. Kao Ying-sun was not be among the returnees; he committed suicide
74 K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 14, p. 6b; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 7, p. 6b; HTC (1958) 183, p. 4985; Davis, Wind
against the mountain, pp. 115–19.
75 Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, p. 2a.
76 Richard L. Davis, Court and family in Sung China, 960–1279: Bureaucratic success and kinship fortunes for the
Shih of Ming-chou (Durham, N.C., 1986), pp. 2–3; Ou-yang Hsiu, Historical records of the Five Dynasties,
trans. Richard L. Davis (New York, 2004), pp. 165–7.
77 SS 421, p. 12598; 451, p. 13277; K’o, Sung shih hsin-pien 175, pp. 8b–9a; Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 9,
pp. 180, 182.
78 SS 425, p. 12687; 454, p. 13347; HTC (1958) 183, p. 4985.
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by starvation soon after securing safe passage north for the imperial entourage.
Many suicides that went unreported occurred both in Lin-an and in the north.
At least one university student, Hsu¨ Ying-piao, refused to join the move to
Peking; he and his family committed suicide in Lin-an. A minor metropolitan
official, Ko T’ien-ssu, opted to strangle himself rather than submit to the con-
querors. Kung Chi, an executive of the agricultural bureau who accompanied
the imperial entourage north, starved himself before reaching Peking.79 The
list of martyrs is far longer than existing documentation suggests, particularly
documentation pertaining to events in the capital during the weeks directly
preceding and following the Yu¨an occupation.
The lives of members of the Sung imperial family in the north passed
without serious incident.80 Chao Hsien, referred to in the official history as
Ying-kuo kung, which was the Yu¨an court’s official designation for him, and
by Sung loyalists in the south as Kung-ti or Kung-tsung, stayed in Peking
and Shang-tu only briefly. Later, he took up residence at a Buddhist monastery
somewhere in the vicinity of Tun-huang, where he raised a family prior to
becoming a monk. The sources suggest that his years as a former emperor were
passed in relative comfort. Exiled to the north along with Chao Hsien was
his great uncle, Chao Yu¨-jui, the father of Tu-tsung. At the time of Lin-an’s
surrender, he had voluntarily returned to the capital upon receiving an urgent
summons from Dowager Empress Hsieh, presumably acting on instructions
from Bayan. The subsequent fate of this senior member of the imperial family,
a man probably in his sixties or seventies, is not known. The seventy-year-old
dowager empress, seriously ill at the time of Bayan’s occupation, was permitted
to delay the trek north for five months. Sent to Peking that summer under
special escort, she passed her final years in solitude at a nunnery in the area,
before dying in 1283. Dowager Empress Ch’u¨an, the empress of Tu-tsung and
Chao Hsien’s mother, may have been in her mid-thirties during the conquest,
but she was now the senior palace figure in the entourage that headed north
in late March, stopping briefly in Peking, and arriving at Shang-tu in mid-
June. She reportedly became absorbed in Buddhism in later years, perhaps
explaining her son’s subsequent devotion to the religion. When death came
in 1309, she was buried somewhere near Peking alongside Dowager Empress
Hsieh. She was survived by her son and apparently a grandson. Khubilai had
kept his promise to cause them no harm.
79 On these individuals, see SS 451, p. 13276; Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 9, p. 180; Feng Kuei-fen and Li
Ming-wan, Su-chou fu-chih (1883; Taipei, 1970) 71, p. 19a; Li Jung et al., Hang-chou fu-chih (1888;
Taipei, 1974) 130, pp. 9a–b; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 124–6.
80 On the whereabouts of the royal family, see SS 418, p. 12539; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 14, p. 6b; Ch’ien,
Nan Sung shu 6, p. 12a; 7, pp. 6b, 8b; Chao, Chao shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 69a–70a, 71b; Davis, Wind against
the mountain, pp. 120–1.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.014
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 21:49:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
946 richard l. davis
the fugitive court
Chao Shih (Tuan-tsung, r. 1276–1278)
The Mongol occupation of Lin-an sealed off the city, and most of the Sung
imperial family were now captive, but a few prominent members had managed
to escape and establish a court in exile in the far south. This government-in-
exile still represented a challenge to the legitimacy of the Yu¨an dynasty. The
court in exile gave Sung loyalists a symbol to rally around and a means of
pressing their opposition to Mongol rule. Their victories in the lower Yangtze
River notwithstanding, the Mongols required several more years to consolidate
their control over all of the Southern Sung domain.
Dowager Empress Hsieh and Ch’en I-chung had initially rejected propos-
als to abandon Lin-an in search of safety farther south. They reasoned that
the court’s composure and confidence would strengthen the resolve of troops
defending the city, should a confrontation occur. In time, Ch’en I-chung him-
self fled and by early February 1276, following the loss of Chia-hsing and Lu
Hsiu-fu’s abortive peace mission, the Sung court quietly appointed Tu-tsung’s
two remaining sons, Chao Shih and Chao Ping, to regional posts in the far
south.81 The decision was allegedly reached at the recommendation of Wen
T’ien-hsiang and under pressure from members of the imperial clan, who were
increasingly concerned about the safety of the emperor’s two brothers, possible
heirs to the throne. The two children departed Lin-an around 8 February, and
in the nick of time, for within a matter of days the Mongol armies sealed off
the city. Dowager Empress Hsieh may have authorized the boys’ assignments
to regional posts, but she clearly had not authorized their departure, for she
dispatched messengers demanding the convoy’s return. In all probability, the
move was carried out by an alliance between prominent members of the impe-
rial clan and operatives in the palace. At any rate, the two boys apparently left
Lin-an under the cover of darkness and in the company of their mothers, a few
close relatives, and a Palace Guard contingent.82
Leading the group was Yang Chen, sheriff of Lin-an and father of Tu-tsung’s
consort Yang. Mongol armies already controlled the northern portion of the
Ch’ien-t’ang River leading to Hang-chou Bay and the ocean. The Mongols
were determined to seal off the chief escape route – the ocean – and prevent
repetition of a mistake made four decades earlier, when valuable energies were
81 SS 47, p. 939; HTC (1958) 182, pp. 4975–6, 4980; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’u¨an-chi 17, p. 453; Li,
Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1255–7; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 244–6.
82 Chien Yu-wen, Sung-mo erh-ti nan-ch’ien nien-lu k’ao (Hong Kong, 1957), pp. 5–8; Davis, Wind against
the mountain, pp. 113, 123, 166–7.
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squandered in the prolonged pursuit of Chin rulers who, through Mongol
carelessness, were allowed to flee their besieged capitals and continue resis-
tance to the Mongol conquest. The Mongol position still left the Sung convoy
with an alternative route to safety, sailing up the Ch’ien-t’ang River to Wu-
chou4 (modern Chin-hua) and then traveling by land to sanctuary. It was a
hazardous escape, and Mongol pursuit forced the fugitives into the moun-
tains for a week, but their evasive tactics succeeded and they reached the
coastal city of Wen-chou in southern Chekiang province. There, the group
rested, replenished their military and naval forces, and set sail for Fu-chou.
Mongol pursuers came perilously close to overtaking the convoy, and the mes-
sengers of Dowager Empress Hsieh did not convince them to return to the
capital.
A frenzy of activity followed as the guardians of the two imperial princes
tried to rally support among civilian and military officials. Former peace envoy
Lu Hsiu-fu was enlisted early on, followed by commander Chang Shih-chieh.
Also joining the group at Wen-chou was Wen T’ien-hsiang. The former coun-
cilor had been forcibly detained since early February by Bayan, who saw that
Wen’s strident loyalism was too great a threat to the current negotiations.
Following the fall of Lin-an, Bayan prepared to have Wen T’ien-hsiang incar-
cerated in the north along with two other former councilors who had been
peace envoys, Wu Chien and Chia Yu¨-ch’ing. The guards took too few pre-
cautions while transporting the men to Peking, with the result that Wen
T’ien-hsiang managed to escape in the vicinity of Chen-chiang, recross the
Yangtze, and flee to Chen-chou2. No sooner was he free than he found himself
in mid-March the object of a murder conspiracy.83 Military commissioner Li
T’ing-chih, incensed by the uncontested surrender of Lin-an in the face of his
own marathon defense of Yang-chou, blamed the surrender on the defeatist
envoys who negotiated the truce. Presuming Wen T’ien-hsiang to have been
party to the treachery, Li planned Wen’s assassination as retribution. It was
impossible for Li to know that the former councilor, held prisoner during the
second round of negotiations, had voiced strong opposition to concessions.
Wen T’ien-hsiang proved resourceful enough to convince the would-be assas-
sins of his genuine loyalty to the Sung cause. His life was spared. His spirits
buoyed by news of the imperial fugitives, he headed south to join them at
Fu-chou, arriving in mid-May.
News of the presence of Tu-tsung’s two surviving sons in the south, out of
reach of the Mongols, inspired other acts of Sung loyalism. An attempt was
made to rescue the imperial entourage, including deposed emperor Kung-ti,
83 SS 421, p. 12602; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’u¨an-chi 17, pp. 453–5; K’o, Sung shih hsin-pien 175, p. 5a;
HTC (1958) 183, p. 4982.
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as they passed along the Grand Canal en route to Peking.84 The incident in
April at Kua-chou (on the Yangtze River halfway between Chen-chou2 and
Yang-chou) was yet another trap sprung by Commissioner Li T’ing-chih, aided
by a reputed forty thousand men. But Dowager Empress Ch’u¨an refused to
support the loyalists, and their rescue effort failed after a brief encounter with
Yu¨an guards. Such a chilly response to rallying Sung loyalists was not universal.
Quite the contrary, popular uprisings erupted in support of the Sung, especially
in Fu-chien and Kuang-nan. Regional commanders and officials, once prepared
to surrender to the Mongols, now renewed their resolve to stand fast.85 Mongol
strategists must have counted on the collapse of Sung resistance after Lin-an’s
surrender, and had not prepared a detailed plan for a major drive against the
south comparable to their recent Yangtze campaign. They had not succeeded
in sealing off Lin-an from the south as well as the north.
Meanwhile, Sung loyalists in the south moved to consolidate their position.
Seven-year-old Chao Shih, eldest son of Tu-tsung and born to Consort Yang,
had been elevated to emperor on the first day of the fifth lunar month, 14
June 1276. The fugitive court, then safely in Fu-chou, occupied the offices
of the prefectural government and began appointing officials. Ch’en I-chung
had resurfaced from his Wen-chou home to join Sung supporters at Fu-chou,
where he was given the post of councilor of the left and quickly asserted his
dominance. Li T’ing-chih, in recognition of his sacrifices at Yang-chou, became
councilor of the right in absentia. He never took up his post or wielded any
political power, for the Mongols captured and executed him later that summer.
Another nominal councilor, appointed to the post in early summer, was Wen
T’ien-hsiang. Conflicts with Ch’en I-chung prompted Wen to resign. He went
home and devoted his energies to military mobilization in his native Kiangsi.
Chang Shih-chieh, a critical figure in the installation of Chao Shih, became
assisting executive in the Bureau of Military Affairs. He spent considerable
time away from Fu-chou, leading armies in battle. So did Fu-chou native
Ch’en Wen-lung, formerly an assistant councilor in Lin-an who had been
reappointed to that post in early summer. Ch’en Wen-lung concentrated on
solidifying Sung control over Fu-chien. The only individual to share power
with Ch’en I-chung over a significant span of time was Lu Hsiu-fu, a peace
emissary with extensive military experience. He became signatory official at
the Bureau of Military Affairs.
It seems curious that the court of Chao Shih should choose to retain the
services of Ch’en I-chung. He had already been exposed as incompetent at
84 SS 421, p. 12602; 451, p. 13268; K’o, Sung shih hsin-pien 175, p. 2b; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59,
pp. 4a–6b; HTC (1958) 182, p. 4982; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1299–1300.
85 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 128, p. 3128; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’u¨an-chi 17, p. 456; Yang Te-en, Wen
T’ien-hsiang nien-p’u, 2nd ed. (1937; Shanghai, 1947), pp. 247–8.
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managing the Mongol menace, which revealed his political inflexibility, his
ineffectiveness at managing the bureaucracy, and his cowardliness, having fled
Lin-an and the Sung court at its time of greatest need. Ch’en I-chung may
have argued, as did others who fled the besieged capital, that his sudden
departure was motivated by the decision, in the face of overwhelming odds, to
retreat strategically farther south and organize new armies. Even if extenuating
circumstances explain his departure in terms other than of cowardice, he was
still the least desirable candidate for chief councilor relative to others. Perhaps
the insecure court, with Dowager Consort Yang serving as regent, considered
that it enhanced its legitimacy by retaining the services of the last major
councilor from the former capital. Perhaps Ch’en I-chung, as bureaucratic
chief in Lin-an, had established a special liaison with Consort Yang’s father,
a one-time metropolitan sheriff, who must have wielded a large measure of
influence at the Fu-chou court-in-exile because of his daughter. But the court
seems to have had few alternatives to former deserters, for it also reappointed
Ch’en Wen-lung to high office despite his earlier desertion. Whatever the
reasons for the retention of Ch’en I-chung, this decision, more than any other
made on the behalf of the child-emperor, weakened the loyalist cause from the
outset.
There were other reasons why the Sung horizon of 1276 looked bleak. Under
the direction of Chang Shih-chieh and Wen T’ien-hsiang, Sung armies had
scored modest gains. In Che-tung, they had regained all or parts of Ch’u¨-
chou, Wu-chou4, and Ming-chou. They had recovered a significant part of
central Kiangsi province. The battles for Fu-chien and Kuang-nan had been
ferocious, with the Sung making significant gains, including the recovery of
Shao-chou2 and Kuang-chou (Canton). Yet most of these recoveries were only
temporary, and late summer brought bad news. Yang-chou and Chen-chou2,
the strategic cites giving control of the mouth of the Yangtze River and also
the two major Sung holdouts north of Lin-an, had finally collapsed after nearly
a year of relentless siege. Captured during the takeover was Commissioner Li
T’ing-chih, who attempted suicide and when this failed was executed. Having
reconsolidated their control of the lower Yangtze, the Mongols pressured the
south with a large autumn offensive. The armies of A-tz’u-han and Tung
Wen-ping moved directly from the north, in a combined land and sea operation
originating at Chen-chiang, while Lu¨ Shih-k’uei and Li Heng advanced further
west through Kiangsi, squeezing the Sung from two directions. When these
armies converged on Chien-ning, northern Fu-chien, late in the year, the Sung
court decided to abandon Fu-chou for safety still farther south. Protected by
an army of reportedly a half million, a doubtfully large number, the court
boarded ships headed for Ch’u¨an-chou, Fu-chien, and subsequently moved
south to Ch’ao-chou, Hui-chou2, and then the greater Kuang-chou area, all
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in Kuang-nan East. Fu-chou fell to the Mongol advance at the end of the
year, early in 1277. One-time Assistant Councilor Ch’en Wen-lung was taken
captive there and sent north. Before reaching Lin-an, he starved himself to
death.
More reversals for the Sung came in 1277, and the search for a safe haven
continued to elude the fugitive court. Unlike the half year’s respite at Fu-
chou, which afforded Sung strategists precious time to regroup and reassess,
subsequent lodgments proved brief. For a year and a half, from early 1277
to mid-1278, the ship-bound court meandered off the coast of Kuang-nan,
disembarking at countless towns and outposts in the vicinity of Kuang-chou.
Under constant enemy pressure, it spent no more than a month or two at each
stop. For all their effort, the Sung forces rarely held onto territory recovered
from the Mongols. Even in the coastal cities of the far south, the Sung hold
was never firm. Kuang-chou changed hands at least five times before being
permanently secured by the Mongols in late 1278. But by mooring for so
long off the Kuang-nan coast the Sung emperor and his armies demonstrated
a commitment to holding the area. Kuang-chou was, after all, the most eco-
nomically prosperous and culturally developed city along the empire’s southern
rim, the indispensable base for any viable restoration movement. The Mongols
understood this and directed their forces appropriately against Kuang-chou.
Apart from the contest over Kuang-chou, the Mongols’ attention also turned
to the interior. Mongol military commander Li Heng continued his attack
into Kiangsi, where he captured most of Wen T’ien-hsiang’s family. From the
heart of Kiangsi, Li Heng advanced into northern Kuang-nan. In late 1277
and early 1278, Li used the terror tactic of ordering a general massacre of Sung
holdouts in Hsing-hua, Fu-chien, and in Ch’ao-chou, Kuang-nan East. This
tactic further inhibited regional support for the Sung, as did local conditions
and conflicts.
The Sung armies had not always tried to appease local populations. In late
1276, at the great port city of Ch’u¨an-chou, for example, Chang Shih-chieh
had needlessly created a major incident by commandeering available ships and
provisions.86 This so incensed the powerful local trade and military commis-
sioner, P’u Shou-keng, that prior to his surrender to the Mongols he responded
by indiscriminately executing Chao imperial clansmen, many of whom resided
in the area; Sung officials; and loyalist troops from the Yangtze region. During
86 On these various incidents, see SS 47, p. 942; HTC (1958) 183, pp. 4995, 5000; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang
ch’u¨an-chi 17, pp. 456–7; Li An, Sung Wen ch’eng-hsiang T’ien-hsiang nien-p’u (Taipei, 1980), pp. 72–81;
Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1390–4; Brown, Wen T’ien-hsiang, pp. 212–14; Huber, “Wen T’ien-hsiang,
1236–1283,” pp. 192–212; Jay, A change in dynasties, pp. 49–55; Davis, Wind against the mountain,
pp. 168–9.
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this unsettled time other regional contenders for power were emerging. There
is record of an execution in Fu-chou in mid-1277 by Wen T’ien-hsiang of a
bogus imperial claimant from T’ing-chou. The suspect, Huang Ts’ung, was
apparently involved in a popular uprising in the interior of Fu-chien directed
against the Sung government. Documents allude to an administrator at T’ing-
chou having “seditious designs” of some sort, the details of which are now lost.
Such incidents serve to demonstrate that Sung armies, while enjoying popular
support in certain quarters, were not necessarily welcomed throughout the
southeast, a situation that benefited no one more than the Mongol conquerors.
Tensions generated by a seemingly hopeless military conflict eventually
took its toll on Sung loyalists. Lu Hsiu-fu reportedly suffered from such acute
depression that while standing in place at court, he could frequently be seen
in tears, having apparently recognized the futility of the cause.87 Defeatism
afflicted others as well. In late 1277, after an epidemic killed vast numbers
of soldiers, Kuang-chou reverted once again to Mongol control, and in the
eleventh lunar month the Sung court fled still farther south to Ching-ao, an
island near modern Macao. This was its eighth stop in less than a year.88 At
that point, Ch’en I-chung must have come into conflict with others and, as
usual for him in such tense settings, took flight. Sailing beyond Hainan Island,
he sought sanctuary in modern Vietnam and later in Laos. References to the
court’s awaiting his return suggests that he had not been formally relieved
of his duties. A palace guardsman was even dispatched to fetch him, which
suggests that he had deserted, and was not lost at sea, as some have concluded.
The court considered taking refuge in Vietnam, possibly at Ch’en I-chung’s
counsel. The decision against the move reflected the waxing influence of a more
realistic and courageous Lu Hsiu-fu.89 To make matters worse, child-emperor
Chao Shih nearly died when his ship sank near Ching-ao. The incident occurred
only a month after Ch’en I-chung’s desertion and coincided with fresh Mongol
advances. The imperial entourage had little alternative but to seek refuge
still farther west. A new island sanctuary, Kang-chou, was near the southern
tip of Kuang-nan West, not far from Hainan Island.90 The emperor, though
snatched from the sinking ship and spared a violent death, never recovered
from the illness that followed the incident. He died on 9 May 1278, not yet ten
years old, at the mountainous Kang-chou hideout. Given the temple name of
87 SS 451, p. 13276.
88 On the route taken, see Ch’eng Kuang-yu¨ et al., Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t’u (Taipei, 1984), vol 2, p. 107.
89 SS 418, p. 12532; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 15a; 61, p. 7b; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih
(1968), vol. 11, pp. 422–43.
90 Some discrepancy exists about the location of Kang-chou; see Chien, Sung-mo erh-ti nan-ch’ien, pp. 77–89;
Li Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, p. 1439; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, p. 442.
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Tuan-tsung, he was eventually interred at the court’s final sanctuary, an island
known as Yai-shan.
Chao Ping (r. 1278–1279)
The third surviving son of Tu-tsung, Chao Ping, was not yet six years old
when his half-brother died.91 He had accompanied the court of Tuan-tsung
throughout its hazardous trek from Lin-an to Kang-chou, attended by Consort
Yu¨, his mother, plus his grandfather and close relatives. The regents of Tuan-
tsung had never officially designated Chao Ping as heir, the transfer of power
between brothers being generally thought undesirable. The seated emperor
being young and of sound health, to name an heir for him would have appeared
inauspicious. Consequently, when Tuan-tsung died, many officials considered
disbanding the court. Under the influence of Lu Hsiu-fu, the resilient chief
councilor, they endorsed elevation of Chao Ping to the throne. The prospect
of the throne passing to yet another child must have been disheartening, but
attrition had thinned the ranks of civilian officers, and this may explain Lu
Hsiu-fu’s ability to prevail. Military support for the action was crucial, and
Chang Shih-chieh was predictably enthusiastic. Two days after his brother’s
death, Chao Ping became emperor. He reigned for the next year and a half at
a court dominated by Lu Hsiu-fu as councilor, Chang Shih-chieh as assistant
chief of the military bureau, and the child’s stepmother, Dowager Consort
Yang, whose two-year regency continued. No mention is made of Chao Ping’s
mother, Consort Yu¨, who if alive would certainly have played some role under
the new regime. Wen T’ien-hsiang continued his military campaign on the
mainland east of Kuang-chou, the metropolis north of the island capital, but
he was isolated from court politics at Yai-shan. After the death of Ch’en Wen-
lung and the desertion of Ch’en I-chung, Wen T’ien-hsiang may have been
the most highly qualified civilian officer still serving the fugitive court, yet
rarely, if ever, was he summoned to the island retreat for consultation.
Yai-shan was to be the Sung dynasty’s last stand. The remaining leadership
appears to have assumed from early on that the aimless itinerancy needed to end.
The island, located just off the coast about twenty-five miles west of modern
Macao, was part of Hsin-hui county and about sixty miles south of Kuang-chou
(Canton).92 Largely mountainous, Yai-shan contained a stretch of relatively
flat or moderately hilly land. It was protected to the east and west by large
91 SS 47, pp. 994–6; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 15, pp. 7a–9b; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, pp. 15a–17a; Chao,
Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 74b–75a.
92 Photographs contained in Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 74b; Chien Yu-wen, ed., Sung huang-t’ai chi-nien-
chi (Hong Kong, 1960), pp. 1–22; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 172–4.
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precipitous islands, from which the name Yai-shan “Cliff Hills” derives. These
tiny islets served as surveillance posts and obstructed passage for intruding
vessels, while shallow waters inhibited any large-scale amphibious approach
from the north. Another strategic advantage was the island’s proximity to the
coast, which facilitated immediate communication between the court and its
remnant armies on the mainland.
Perhaps more telling in terms of dynastic intentions is the size of the
Yai-shan stronghold. Sources vary somewhat, but the consensus appears to be
that Sung settlers, importing craftsmen from coastal Kuang-nan, rapidly built
some thirty palaces and three thousand other units to house the remaining two
hundred thousand soldiers who had been compelled to live on ships for the past
two years.93 The Sung imperial entourage, even at this late stage, must have
been larger than the small group that fled Lin-an two years earlier, even though
the boast of two hundred thousand militia contradicts references to an army of
“several tens of thousands,” attributed to Lu Hsiu-fu shortly before the flight
to Yai-shan.94 Having suffered defeats on the mainland and repeated retreats
along the coast, the fugitive Sung court is unlikely to have retained command of
several hundred thousand men, however diligent it may have been in recruiting
militia from the larger Kuang-nan region. The community on Yai-shan may
have been only one-fourth its reported size, but a force approaching even fifty
thousand represented a threat to Mongol hegemony.
The geographic scope of Sung resistance shrank substantially in 1278, just
as the court was entrenching itself at Yai-shan in anticipation of a protracted
war. The Szechwan region, if sufficiently free of enemy occupation, might have
offered future sanctuary for imperial fugitives. Previously in 1258, the Mongols
had gained a foothold in Szechwan when they captured Ch’eng-tu, neighboring
cities, and counties to the north. The Sung had regained much of the territory
lost that year, but not the strategically vital city of Ch’eng-tu, which except
for a brief spell in early 1273, had remained firmly in Mongol hands and
later became an administrative center for their western front. For most of Tu-
tsung’s reign, the Sung and Mongol armies had concentrated their attentions
and resources on Hsiang-yang and central Sung territory. This strategy did
not entirely neglect the Szechwan theater, and the Sung had made at least two
unsuccessful attempts to regain Ch’eng-tu, in 1270, and in 1273.
Sung forces had more success in Ch’ung-ch’ing, the riverine hub that was
critical to holding the western stretches of the Yangtze River. The city had
come under repeated assault by Mongol forces between 1270 and 1272, but
93 Chien, Sung-mo erh-ti nan-ch’ien, p. 90; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 15b; HTC (1958) 184, p. 5015; Chao,
Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 74b.
94 HTC (1958) 183, p. 5012.
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it had held its ground. Another important city on the upper Yangtze River,
Lu-chou3, southwest of Ch’ung-ch’ing, had fallen to the Mongols twice in the
early 1260s, but had been recovered both times and had remained part of Sung
territory for the duration of the Tu-tsung reign. Ho-chou4 was an impenetrable
Sung enclave located about sixty miles north of Ch’ung-ch’ing, where the Fu,
Chia-ling, and Ch’u¨ rivers all converge as they turn south toward Ch’ung-
ch’ing. Ho-chou4 is famed as the place where Mo¨ngke, the Mongol ruler,
had died during a lengthy assault on the city in 1259. Frequently harassed
by the enemy in the early 1270s, Ho-chou4 had remained firmly in Sung
hands.95 Sung control over these areas, by denying the Mongols access to the
Yangtze River from the west, prevented the Mongols from using the river
to launch large-scale naval offensives against cities downstream in eastern
Szechwan and western Hupei. Over two-thirds of Szechwan had already been
conquered by the Mongols by the Tu-tsung era. The Sung leadership and their
agents in the west appear to have invested in the defense of major cities of
Szechwan at the expense of smaller towns. This tactic preserved a facade of
control but a vulnerable facade that mitigated against dynastic interests in the
long term.
Khubilai had adopted an east-first strategy for conquering the Sung, and
the fall of Lin-an enabled his armies to turn their attention once more to
conquering Szechwan. In 1277 there were major assaults against Ch’ung-
ch’ing, Ho-chou4, and Fu-chou6, all major centers in the western Sung empire.
Results from these attacks were initially unimpressive, perhaps because conflict
in the east prevented the Mongols from committing more than ten thousand
or twenty thousand men in any one western campaign. However, perseverance
by the Mongols paid off in 1278. Ch’ung-ch’ing and Lu-chou3 in the west fell
early in the year, roughly coinciding with Mongol acquisition of Nan-p’ing,
Po-chou2, and Shih-chou2, south of the Yangtze, and to the north, K’uei-
chou2, capital of K’uei-chou circuit, and Wan-chou in the Yangtze gorges. This
campaign completed Mongol command of the Yangtze River from the western
fringes of Szechwan to the ocean. Among the last Szechwan cities to hold out
was Ho-chou4. With a population of roughly eighty thousand households and
no contact with the outside for several years, it staved off the enemy until early
1279. The reasons for prolonged resistance in the west, in some cases three
years after the dynasty’s formal surrender at Lin-an, are not easy to discern.
Many Szechwan cities capitulated only in the aftermath of extended periods
of drought and famine, which made further defense virtually impossible. The
holdouts must have heard that the Sung court was in the far south following
95 On the conflict in these areas, see Hu et al., Sung-mo Ssu-ch’uan, pp. 138, 168, 259, 514–18, 547–51;
Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1318–26.
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the fall of Lin-an, but in the absence of official communications from the Sung
court, and there had been none since its loss of Lin-an, they continued to defend
Szechwan in the dynasty’s name.96 In contrast to the massive desertions in the
east, the stubborn resistance in Szechwan could only have heartened the Sung
court-in-exile. When the Mongols finally took Szechwan in 1278–9, the Sung
court had very few outposts remaining of its once great empire.
With most of Hunan, Kwangsi, and Szechwan in hostile hands, the only
hope for Sung resisters lay in retaining control of the southern Kiangsi and
northern Kuang-nan regions where Wen T’ien-hsiang was currently fighting,
and his prospects were bleak. Khubilai had reaffirmed his determination to
conquer all of the Southern Sung realm with a new series of campaigns. In
addition to a Kwangsi offensive launched in 1277 and a Yunnan offensive
begun in the spring of 1278, Khubilai inaugurated a third and final sweep of
the southeast coastal region in mid-1278.97 Li Heng, a Tangut in the service
of the Yu¨an, had already seized much of Kiangsi during the previous year,
forcing Wen T’ien-hsiang to retreat from the interior to coastal Kuang-nan.
The Mongol coastal offensive of 1278, intended to complement Li Heng’s
efforts, was amphibious. Deploying some twenty thousand men, the Mongols
sought to consolidate control over the long-contested coastal cities of Fu-chien
and Kuang-nan. Chang Hung-fan (d. 1280) was commissioned to supervise
the naval force. This was a noteworthy selection because Chang Hung-fan was
a Chinese commander and had blood ties to Chang Shih-chieh, his nephew
serving the Sung as their general commander. The assignment underscored
the increased isolation of the Southern Sung loyalists and the extent to which
they had sacrificed home and family by refusing to submit. By the end of
1278, loyalist armies had lost the coastal prefectures of Chang-chou, Ch’ao-
chou, and Hui-chou2, in effect, all of the remaining Sung holdings in coastal
Fu-chien and Kuang-nan East. This left Wen T’ien-hsiang trapped inland
at Wu-p’o-ling, a mountain range roughly fifty miles east of Hui-chou2 at
Hai-feng in central Kuang-nan East. He and his army were overrun there on
2 February 1279 by a surprise attack led by Chang Hung-fan.98 Attempting
suicide, Wen was taken captive. Chang Hung-fan then joined forces with Li
Heng at Kuang-chou, a city only recently retaken by Mongol armies. There
they prepared for a naval assault on Yai-shan.
As the Mongol fleet made their approach to the Sung citadel at the end
of February 1279, Chang Shih-chieh had already learned, no doubt from
96 Hu et al., Sung-mo Ssu-ch’uan, p. 475.
97 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 129, pp. 3157–8; HTC (1958) 184, pp. 5016, 5020–1; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang
ch’u¨an-chi 17, pp. 458–64.
98 Davis, Wind against the mountain, p. 174.
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informants, of their movements and was preparing for the attack.99 Reports
claim that in the harbor opening to Yai-shan, he formed a line of a thousand
oceangoing boats and ships. Once they were anchored, maneuvered by his
crack troops, and protected against arrows and incendiary missiles by matting
along their sides, the Sung emperor and his court went on board a large vessel
in the center of the line. The imperial presence was intended to strengthen
the resolve of war-weary and homesick soldiers, but it may also have been
designed to facilitate the court’s swift flight should the need arise. Antici-
pating this, the Mongols first moved to seal off escape routes to the north
and west, and then began harassing the Sung flotilla from the south. Chang
Hung-fan pressed Wen T’ien-hsiang, held captive on board a Mongol ship,
to plead with Chang Shih-chieh to surrender. Wen T’ien-hsiang adamantly
refused, perhaps confident in the superiority of Sung naval strength. Chang
Hung-fan then tried to set fire to the Sung ships, using incendiary rafts as
had been done on the Yangtze at Chiao-shan. This also failed. Mongol forces
appeared leery of risking an all-out assault, so they blockaded the Sung fleet,
and maintained their pressure for over a half month.
The tension accompanying this confrontation with the Mongols weakened
Sung patience and resolve, but other problems also took their toll. Although
the Sung fleet had prepared for a battle, they were not ready for what amounted
to a siege. Their supplies of fresh water were depleted, and some of those aboard
the Sung ships drank seawater and became sick. Weapons too were in short
supply, and probably food as well. On 19 March 1279 the Mongols exploited
the changing tides to attack the anchored Sung ships from both north and
south. The Sung losses were staggering. The next morning brought rain and
dense fog, but this did not veil from Chang Shih-chieh and Lu Hsiu-fu the
sad truth: they had lost the bulk of their navy, and this time there was no
escape. Wishing to spare the six-year-old emperor the humiliation of captivity,
Councilor Lu Hsiu-fu firmly clutched the child, dressed in his imperial robes
and carrying the imperial seals, and plunged into the sea. Only a hundred or
so military and civilian officers chose to surrender. According to most sources,
including both the Sung and Yu¨an dynastic histories (Sung shih and Yu¨an
shih), some one hundred thousand soldiers followed the emperor in suicidal
drowning.100 Chang Shih-chieh managed to escape with a dozen or so smaller
ships. He returned before long to assess the situation and came upon Dowager
Consort Yang, who was still within the Yai-shan stronghold. Mongol leaders
99 On the Yai-shan debacle, see Chiang I-hsu¨eh, Lu Hsiu-fu nien-p’u (Taipei, 1977), pp. 23–7; HTC (1958)
184, pp. 5024–8; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 1477–82; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968),
vol. 11, pp. 442–5; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 1–5; Jay, A change of dynasties, pp. 56–9.
100 SS 47, p. 945; Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 129, p. 3158; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 16b; 7, p. 7a; 61, p. 7b;
HTC (1958) 184, p. 5027; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, pp. 444–5; Davis,
Wind against the mountain, pp. 1–5.
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apparently decided, after their sea victory, not to bother with occupation of the
island. On learning of her stepson’s death, the dowager threw herself into the
sea. She was buried on the beach by Chang Shih-chieh, who then himself died
by drowning, whether by accident or suicide is not known. His navy, reduced
to about ten ships, disbanded.
Accounts of the last months of the Sung dynasty at Yai-shan must be viewed
skeptically. Eyewitness accounts of the affair are few. Lu Hsiu-fu’s personal
diary, intended as a history of those crucial years, was lost. Mongol records,
based most likely upon reports from military officers, are terse.101 The only
Sung survivor to bear personal witness to the Yai-shan defeat and commit it
to written record was Wen T’ien-hsiang, a man too politically passionate to
be wholly credible as a historical source, and the number of people he reports
as dying at Yai-shan is clearly exaggerated. It is hardly credible that the Sung
court during its last desperate days possessed either a thousand warships or
a hundred thousand soldiers. The many thousands of bodies found floating
on the sea may represent war casualties, not suicide victims. Combat into
the late night and dense fog at the next dawn were also sources of confusion.
However, the Mongol delay in attacking at Yai-shan until Sung forces were
beset with shortages of food and water suggests that the Sung navy was far
from small. The Mongol forces apparently stood at roughly thirty thousand
to forty thousand, so a Sung force of fifty thousand or sixty thousand men
is not unwarranted. As for mass suicide, while the numbers may be inflated,
the incident undeniably occurred. Substantial documentation exists for other
cases of mass suicide among Sung loyalists shortly before or after capitulation
to the enemy. Perhaps the most notable was at T’an-chou (Ch’ang-sha) in 1275,
where thousands took their own lives.102 The question to be asked, therefore, is
not whether tens of thousands committed suicide at Yai-shan, for the numbers
are not as pertinent as the issue of why.
The siege of Lin-an had induced a cowardly response, with civilian and
military officials deserting on a massive scale. The contrast with Yai-shan,
just three years later, is confounding. Among traditional historians, a com-
mon explanation holds that the earlier ambivalence was a response to inept
political leadership, which alienated many of those who were conscientious
and loyal. Certainly, child-emperors occupied the throne in both Lin-an and
Yai-shan, and the councilor Ch’en I-chung offered the same lackluster lead-
ership at both courts. It may be that Dowager Empress Hsieh’s decision, at
Ch’en I-chung’s prompting, to surrender Lin-an without a fight effectively
demoralized court supporters and undermined much loyalist sentiment. The
decision by Chang Shih-chieh and Lu Hsiu-fu to stand firm at Yai-shan was in
101 SS 451, pp. 13276–7.
102 SS 450, pp. 13253–6; Davis, Wind against the mountain, p. 110–12.
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striking contrast. If standing firm was critical, then Dowager Empress Hsieh’s
initial decision to confront the enemy without moving the capital should have
similarly inspired loyalists to resist militarily, if not to attack Lin-an to break
the enemy encirclement, but this did not happen.
Another explanation of the contrast between 1276 and 1279 lies in the
composition of the court. Those who followed the court all the way to Yai-
shan were a small select group, more cohesive and steadfast in their loyalist
convictions than the diverse body of officials serving in Lin-an. But there were
some men, such as Ch’en Wen-lung, who fled Lin-an in 1276, but chose suicide
over submission to the enemy in 1279. A factor that cannot be overlooked in
the defeat at Yai-shan is sheer desperation. When the Mongols descended
upon Lin-an, the Sung court could still claim control over a good deal of the
far south, roughly half of the domain. For loyalists hoping to revive the dynasty,
other places remained as alternative locations to carry on the resistance, while
surrendering the city would avoid the slaughter of its million people. Yai-shan,
on the contrary, represented the edge of the Sung world, and its collapse was
the end of the Sung cause. There was no refuge left. Perhaps holdouts there,
having learned of the brutal Mongol slaughter at Ch’ao-chou only a year earlier,
assumed that a similar fate awaited them and chose suicide over execution.
Circumstantial factors aside, I suspect that the spirit of loyalism did not
suddenly materialize at Yai-shan. It was always present, a product of the Sung
dynasty’s unique cultural traditions and a testimony to the government’s effec-
tiveness in using education to mold culture. Whatever the motives of the men
and women at Yai-shan, the Sung court, and especially in the final weeks when
confronted with the grim prospect of Mongol domination, was able to generate
a high degree of loyalist fervor. To the Sung dynasty’s great misfortune, the
sense of common purpose that unified tens of thousands at Yai-shan did not
surface sooner, during the 1250s and 1260s for example, when the Mongol
pressure was relieved by their own civil warfare but most Sung civil servants
allowed partisan interests to prevail at the expense of a shared commitment to
the dynasty.
Legacy under assault
After the fall of Yai-shan, the body of Chao Ping, the child-emperor, was
reportedly retrieved from the ocean and buried in the vicinity of modern
Hong Kong, and a small temple was erected on the site.103 Dowager Consort
Yang and Lu Hsiu-fu were both buried, in unfitting simplicity, near Yai-shan.
In the late fifteenth century, during Ming-dynasty China, a series of temples,
103 HTC (1958) 184, p. 5026; Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 75a.
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some of them impressive in grandeur, were built at Yai-shan in honor of those
who perished there.104 As for members of the imperial family who died in
captivity, they were afforded honorable burials in the north.
With the exception of the last three child-emperors, most Southern Sung
rulers and their empresses were buried in the western suburbs of Shao-hsing,
not far from the eastern stretches of Hsiao-shan county about sixty miles east of
Lin-an. The site was then known as Pao-shan, “Precious Mountain.” Endowed
with an abundance of level land relieved by rolling hills, the spot reflected the
majesty of its imperial residents, yet it was sufficiently isolated to provide the
dead with a relatively secure sanctuary. The Sung imperial tombs were scattered
over a large area. Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung, along with their spouses, had
been interred not far from one another, but a handsome distance separated
Kuang-tsung and Ning-tsung from preceding emperors and from one another.
The Li-tsung and Tu-tsung graves, probably reasonably close to each other,
were similarly distanced from the others. Precious Mountain also contained the
graves of the Northern Sung emperors Hui-tsung and Ch’in-tsung, who had
died in Jurchen captivity. The bodies of Hui-tsung and his empress Wei had
been transported south and interred at Precious Mountain, but Ch’in-tsung
had been buried near Peking, probably alongside his wife, so his “tomb” at
Precious Mountain was more a memorial shrine than an actual grave.
In light of Khubilai’s beneficence toward the Chao imperial clan held cap-
tive by him, there was little reason to think that the Yu¨an would set out to
desecrate the Sung imperial tombs. Yet sometime in early January 1279, as
the Sung court-in-exile prepared for its final showdown at a distant Yai-shan,
the Sung tombs at Precious Mountain were being unearthed and pillaged.105
The chief instigator was Yang-lien Chen-chia, a Tangut monk prominent in
the Yangtze region and politically well connected. His alleged motive was
retribution for the Sung’s one-time desecration of Buddhist temples. In con-
structing both the Ning-tsung tomb at Precious Mountain and a ritual altar
by the Ch’ien-t’ang River in Lin-an, the Sung government had destroyed
several well-known Buddhist temples. These actions apparently appeared to
many, and especially to an angry Buddhist clergy, as an imperial assault on
religious institutions that should not go unpunished. Yet the pillaging of pre-
cious funerary relics leaves little doubt that religious retribution was less an
objective than simple theft. Without Khubilai’s approval, Yang-lien Chen-
chia chased away custodial guards and unearthed, first, the massive tombs of
104 Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 80b.
105 On the incident, see Wan Ssu-t’ung, comp., Nan Sung liu-ling i-shih [1821–50 ed.] (Taipei, 1968),
pp. 1a–13b; HTC (1958) 184, pp. 5021–4; Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 78b–80a; Ting Ch’uan-
ching, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (Shanghai, 1935) I, pp. 98–101; Rossabi, Khubilai khan, pp. 195–9.
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Ning-tsung and Ning-tsung’s empress Yang2, then the magnificently
appointed tombs of Li-tsung and Tu-tsung, followed before long by the crypts
of other former emperors and empresses. In the process of plundering, the
intruders crudely tore burial garments from bodies only partly decomposed.
The head of Li-tsung, ripped from the body, was played with like a toy. The
looters left corpses strewn about as well, with no apparent concern for either
etiquette or hygiene, while destroying a sizable portion, if not all, of the mag-
nificent funeral statuary surrounding the graves. Yang-lien Chen-chia’s plan
was to devote some of the wealth to building a Buddhist pagoda on the banks
of Hang-chou’s Ch’ien-t’ang River – indeed, on the very grounds of the Sung
imperial palaces – while burying the bones of Sung emperors underneath,
thereby achieving the dual insult of desecrating the former residences of these
Sung emperors and forcing them to bear posthumous witness to it all.
Precisely what happened to the exhumed imperial bodies is the source of
some debate. The consensus among later writers is that two heroic locals,
T’ang Yu¨ and Lin Te-yang, learned in advance of the intended unearthing and
removed nearly all of the bodies beforehand. They subsequently reburied the
remains elsewhere, some being interred as far away as Chia-hsing. Only the
body of Li-tsung appears genuinely to have fallen into the looters’ hands. This
contradicts significantly the earliest known account of the incident, written by
the eminent late Sung anecdotist Chou Mi (1239–98), who insisted that the
graves had all, in fact, been desecrated by pillagers. Later writers dismiss this
as erroneous. With tombs being so scattered, they note, disentombment would
have demanded several months of effort, so the removal of bodies beforehand
might have occurred. Advance removal is the only explanation for Chou Mi’s
reported astonishment at learning that the vaults of Hui-tsung, Kao-tsung,
and Hsiao-tsung were totally empty, free even of bones.106 This revisionist
interpretation has its flaws. How did T’ang Yu¨ and Lin Te-yang evade guards
responsible for protecting Precious Mountain, guards whom Yang-lien Chen-
chia overcame only with considerable force? How could two men, with no more
than the help of a few friends, complete a massive unearthing and reburial on
short order when tombs were large, well sealed, and scattered over an extensive
area? I suspect both interpretations are partially correct. Disentombment by
northern pillagers probably did occur, although they may well not have com-
pleted things before encountering some local reaction, namely, the interven-
tion of our two heroes. In the case of Hui-tsung, Kao-tsung, and Hsiao-tsung,
where pillaging occurred last, there may have been time for locals to remove
the bodies in advance; otherwise, T’ang Yu¨ and friends merely retrieved bodies
already exhumed and abandoned near the vaults. In any event, the sprawling
106 Wan, Nan Sung liu-ling i-shih, pp. 12b–13b.
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burial preserve at Precious Mountain was gutted.107 Palaces at Lin-an were
not spared either. Some were demolished by Yang-lien Chen-chia to build his
White Tower pagoda, while others were converted into monasteries.
According to contemporaries, Yang-lien Chen-chia confiscated precious
objects from over a hundred tombs in the lower Yangtze and seized countless
parcels of land.108 Admittedly, the Yu¨an court did not authorize these actions
and eventually intervened to stop them, yet vengeful malice of this sort should
not be attributed to the eccentricity of a few religious fanatics. Mongol con-
querors, by stripping Sung palaces of valuables and then distributing these
among various princes, had set a precedent of cultural desecration that others
with privilege learned to exploit aggressively.
Malice and greed are understandable, but the desecration helped reinforce
loyalist sentiment among Han Chinese. Wen T’ien-hsiang was the most emi-
nent personification of that spirit. The one-time Sung councilor, taken cap-
tive in Kuang-nan, remained in captivity in Peking for four years, 1279–83.
Khubilai reportedly admired his fortitude and hoped to win him over. Wen
T’ien-hsiang could not be swayed, and his execution in early 1283 further
reinforced anti-Mongol sentiment in the south. This sentiment went along
with the trend among a majority of educated men of the early Yu¨an, partic-
ularly southerners, to boycott the regime’s civil service as they pursued other
professional alternatives, even at economic and political sacrifice.109
The death in 1279 of the last established Sung emperor, and the loss of
his imperial regalia, prompted a self-serving observation by the great Mongol
military leader, Bayan. Alluding to Sung T’ai-tsu’s dethronement in 959 of
the six-year-old emperor Chou Kung-ti (r. 959), the last emperor of the Later
Chou dynasty (951–9), Bayan observed that T’ai-tsu had taken the empire
over from a child, and that the last of the Sung emperors was also a child.
107 Ann Paludan notes: “For the second half of the Song dynasty, there were no spirit roads. Determined
to regain the northern half of the country the Southern Song regarded their sojourn in Hangzhou as
temporary. Burials were provisional, awaiting return to the dynastic graveyard at Gongxian. Their tombs
were given the official name ‘temporary sepulchres’ (cuan gong) rather than mausoleum (ling), [and] the
scale was very small, tumuli being only two metres high and a bare five metres in circumference”; see
Ann Paludan, The Chinese spirit road: The classical tradition of stone tomb statuary (New Haven, Conn.,
1991), p. 148.
108 Wan, Nan Sung liu-ling i-shih, pp. 6a–b.
109 Frederick W. Mote, “Confucian eremitism in the Yu¨an period,” in The Confucian persuasion, ed. Arthur F.
Wright (Stanford, Calif., 1960), pp. 202–43; Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 164–5, 180–1.
For contrasting views of the extent and significance of eremitism in the early Yu¨an, see Jay, A change in
dynasties, and Paul J. Smith, “Fear of gynarchy in an age of chaos: Kong Qi’s reflections on life in south
China under Mongol rule,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 41 No. 1 (1998), pp. 1–95.
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